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August 23, 2009
No explanation can adequately address the horrors carried out in Gojra Pakistan. But these horrors are newsworthy and have potential to serve as a lesson in uprooting such inhumanity. Rather than focusing squarely and vaguely on vast historical causation that might allow factions to commit these horrors, a closer look at multifaceted ways in which to uproot that causation by drawing on recent history is valuable.
Because in some ways recent events are repetitive of the country’s history of cyclical, civilian to military governance. Just over half of 62 years of Pakistani statehood have been spent under martial law (which is bizarre, though not entirely as alarming as it sounds). Civilian regimes have been notoriously corrupt and did little to bring about democracy when scrutinized beyond the cover of a “civlian” title. Given this backdrop and our long engagement with Islamabad, Washington’s lenses should be discerning when dealing with Pakistan. But events like Gojra, the Mumbai atrocities and relentless, daily plight Pakistan’s military and civilians face in uprooting terror from in and around their borders, consistently begs the question: what is still going wrong?
If we draw on recent events for explanation, there is one consistency: Since the War on Terror began, Pakistan was most stable under Musharraf with respect to security and international standing and since his departure, the economy is deteriorating.
Correlating these successes to Msuharraf’s tenure might come across as reductive, but it is tangible. Thus, to better formulate our strategy in Pakistan given the luxury of hindsight, it could be useful to revisit Musharraf’s policies by way of dispelling vociferous censures that follow him until now:
As a military leader Musharraf’s governance deepened the cycle of martial law ultimately not allowing a democracy to take shape in Pakistan:
- Not necessarily: South Asian policy expert Anatol Lieven explains “All civilian governments have been guilty of corruption, election rigging and the imprisonment or murder of political opponents, in some cases to a worse degree than the military administrations that followed.” And the pool from which to select leaders post Musharraf offered little hope for anything different. Alternative options were extensions of the very leadership Lieven explains. They offered dynastic governance (Benazir Bhutto as daughter of Zulfiqar Bhutto) or perpetual subversion of democracy through maintaining a feudal system (Asif Zardari). In fact, the feudal system wherein masses of uneducated Pakistani’s are bound to a servile existence is what causes this kind of aristocracy to reign. This rampant subversion of Pakistani citizenry is a far cry from democracy.
- Musharraf indirectly addressed this by privatizing news media. This profoundly affected everyday Pakistani’s by spurring, fresh news, views, ideas, occupations and attention independent of state censorship and interest. Something I took for granted until spending time in Karachi before Musharraf’s tenure (especially under Sharif’s government). If anti- Americanism was a problem in Pakistan, Sharif’s rigid and religious driven censorship of television, and print media certainly did not help while Musharraf’s policies, did.
- On a side note: although media privatization is eclipsed by other news out of Pakistan in the past few years, I cite this as Musharraf’s crowning achievement. I maintain that its effects will have lasting impact on ultimately allowing a viable democracy to take shape in Pakistan by way of a meaningful dissemination of independent and increasingly globalized information.
Musharraf should not be credited with the economic growth because it was driven by foreign support funds from the War on Terror which would have been collected from cooperation by any Pakistani government in power at the time:
- Also while investments were “paternalistic” during martial law, economic growth actually did, “trickle down” as was seen in major cities. A more modernized standard of living through increased consumption and access to products reflected this economic expansion amongst all levels in society. For the first time in Karachi, I saw hired help, including chauffeurs who are part of the working class carrying cell phones and purchasing American DVD’s. Women were increasingly seen occupying positions in the financial sector and politics. So military paternalism, is sadly more productive than the civilian corruption that takes place because it means funds are at least circulated domestically, rather than driven out of the country entirely.
Now I’m not equating these specific instances of consumption and progress necessarily to full-fledged support of Musharraf, nor am I making a case for permanent military rule in Pakistan or condoning military corruption. However, such tangible developments amidst unfounded criticism and the reality of Pakistan’s history should inform Washington. A senior fellow on South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations perhaps prescribed this best in 2007:
Musharraf offers Washington continuity in the face of uncertain political transition. He is a familiar face, a leader with whom the Bush administration has established a sustained working relationship. Under even the smoothest possible transition scenarios, Musharraf’s departure would interrupt bilateral cooperation on military, counterterrorism, and intelligence matters for days or weeks—with uncertain consequences for U.S. security
In hindsight, this assessment is quite apt. Musharraf was an ally who provided results and continued to successfully expand our efforts in the War on Terror. Not just for U.S. interests, but for Pakistani interests in security and development. Had Musharraf not fired the Supreme Court judges and declared the state of emergency that wound up dismissing further justices, he might have maintained his leadership that is needed in Pakistan at this time. And I hope the Obama Administration takes this recent history into close consideration when formulating our ongoing cooperation with leaders in Islamabad.
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Posted in International Affairs, International Relations | Tagged Anatol Lieven, Benazir Bhutto, Bhutto, civilian government in pakistan, civilian government pakistan, civilian military rule in pakistan, civilian rule in pakistan, democracy in pakistan, democracy musharraf, democracy pakistan, democratization in pakistan, General Musharraf, general pervez musharraf, Gojra, Gojra Pakistan, martial law in pakistan, martial law pakistan, military governance in pakistan, military rule in pakistan, military rule pakistan, Musharraf, musharraf and democracy, musharraf in hindsight, musharraf zainab jeewanjee, Mushy sahib, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan, pakistan corruption, Pakistan democracy, Pakistan economy, Pakistan leader, pakistan martial law, Pakistan media, pakistan military, Pakistan military leader, Pakistan president, Pakistan prime minister, Pervez Musharraf, US Pakistan relations, war on terror, zainab jeewanjee | 13 Comments »
August 21, 2009
Polls opened today in Afghanistan with Washington watching closely in hopes that elections are peaceful and leave a lasting mark of democracy for future state building. Pakistan has the same interest on perhaps an even more immediate level. Successful elections in Afghanistan are an integral ingredient to Pakistan’s domestic offensive in uprooting dangerous factions, expanding the economy, nurturing their democracy and stabilizing relations with neighbors. But if a candidate does not receive at least 50% of votes in this first round, “elections are pushed into a second, more unpredictable round of voting“. And second round elections might agitate an already rickety political climate amidst apprehensions of violence, which is entirely detrimental for Pakistan given domestic and regional circumstances right now.
On the domestic front, Pakistan’s military continues to make progress against dangerous groups. Weakened by the death (and or disappearance) of leader Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban in Pakistan “seems to be in disarray”. Meaning Islamabad’s offensive against factions this year are bearing fruits for the War on Terror and shifting toward more stability, hopefully for the long term. But if elections in Afghanistan are pushed to a second round, weeks of political irresolution can allow terrorist groups a climate of uncertainty within which to recuperate from losses and cause turmoil. Which since 2001 has shown that a dangerous spillover effect exists wherein Afghani militant groups shift in to Pakistan harboring themselves into the nebulous, virtually imperturbable border.
Broader regional considerations also factor into Pakistan’s hopes for stable elections. The spillover of militant groups since 9/11 intensifies Pakistan’s long desired interest in seeing a democratic, stable Afghanistan where refugees may repatriate. In fact,Pakistan hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world, an underreported story that actually helps explain why dangerous factions were able to develop in Pakistan. Millions of devastated Afghans, some armed and many destitute from fighting Soviets in the 1980’s found refuge from their war ravaged country in Pakistan. A mostly destitute population seeking refuge in a developing country with highly volatile political circumstances allowed violent sectarian and religiously extremist factions to exploit and recruit refugees to their cause. In addition, there are heavy economic costs for Pakistan in maintaining such a large number of refugees. Since last years military escalation in Afghanistan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees explains that there is around 2 to 2.1 million Afghani Refugees now living in Pakistan. He said the United Nations planned to launch an emergency appeal for hundreds of millions of dollars needed to sustain refugees that have come in just this past year. So peaceful elections in a first round that move Afghanistan in a direction of democratic stability is integral to Pakistan’s security: they relieve Islamabad of a very costly responsibility to a long-standing refugee challenge.
Although some minority, yet raucous opinions say elections ushering democratic authority are not in Islamabad’s interest because they “diminish Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan”. Thus suggesting policymakers are strategically motivated to prevent losing an allegedly malleable buffer zone that Afghanistan serves against India. It’s an unlikely, poorly reasoned notion. It attempts to be qualified by citing Islamabad’s insistence on uprooting domestic militant/fundamentalist groups, so as to avoid confrontation with a supposed malleable buffer forces. But expecting policy makers to divert efforts from turmoil at home to external threats is a laughable assertion. Before taking care of neighboring militant groups whose primary focus is not on fighting Pakistanis, Islamabad legitimately devotes resources to uprooting domestic factions who pose an immediate threat. Suicide bombings have become an almost weekly recurrence in Pakistan and with that level of instability, faulting Pakistan for not doing enough to uproot neighboring terror is outrageous. Plus, NATO forces and amplified American presence in Afghanistan furthers the absurdity of such calls for Pakistan to ignore turmoil at home and focus on Afghanistan. And neither of these allegations logically indicate a Pakistani motivation for instability so as to use Afghanistan as a buffer zone.
But perhaps the most unreasonable way of supporting a notion that Pakistan lacks interest in successful elections refers to relations with India. Specifically, that Islamabad’s refusal to remove forces from the Indian border despite current spillover from Afghanistan indicates an excessive concern with an Indian threat. A few reasons why this is incorrect: firstly, referring again to amplified U.S. and current NATO presence and given an abundance of domestic threats that require Islamabad’s attention, removing troops from the Indian border to the Afghan border does little to help Pakistan now, (especially weighted against the risks of doing so). Secondly, even if troops from were redeployed, those forces are squarely trained/equipped to face a potential Indian threat, not in counterterrorism. Which became well known much to Washington’s dismay with the military’s many unsuccessful attempts at uprooting militants from the northern regions along the Afghan border.
Finally, a refusal to redeploy forces is not because of an excessive concern given the reality of current Indian-Pakistani relations. The Mumbai atrocities occurred less than a year ago and the aftermath saw a speedy, vehement escalation of tensions. Some Indian media and politicians fanned the flames, and when tensions rise between India and Pakistan, the world gets nervous. By way of a counterfactual, we can tie how these tensions relate to justifying Islamabad’s decision to maintain troops on the border: If, God Forbid, another atrocity took place on Indian soil since 11/26/08 and Pakistan had redeployed troops away from the border. The result could be an even further escalation of tensions. A terrifying potential for confrontation ensues and Pakistan’s capacity to defend against an already far more immense Indian force is drastically diminished. Which itself has a potential to cause hasty, over offensive beahvior from either side. Basic lessons in Realism thus teach us that redeployment away from the Indian border is out of the question. Given history, and sensitive circumstances since 11/26 I think military strategy might advise the same. Thus from a Pakistani policymakers point of view, troops on the Indian border is a legitimate priority. If anything, one might even argue they deter confrontation.
So, allegations that Islamabad is not sufficiently committed to stable election processes in Afghanistan are just not reasonable. If anything, successful elections relieve Pakistan of deep social and economic costs through refugee repatriation. And from the Mumbai atrocities to countless civilians who suffer daily from terror and a climate of instability that allows violent factions to operate, a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan beginning with successful elections is very much in Pakistan’s interest.
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Posted in International Affairs, International Relations | Tagged 2009 election afghanistan, 2009 elections for afghanistan, 2009 elections in afghanistan, af-pak cooperation, af-pak region, af-pak relations, af-pak strategy, af-pak taliban, af-pak terrorism, af-pak war, af-pak war on terror, afghan buffer zone, afghan election, afghan election 2009, Afghan elections, afghan pakistan relations, Afghan refugees, afghan refugees in pakistan, afghan refugees united nations, afghani election 2009, afghani refugees, afghani refugees in pakistan, afghanistan buffer zone, afghanistan election abdullah, afghanistan election karzai, afghanistan elections, afghanistan elections 2009, afghanistan elections pakistan, afghanistan militants, afghanistan pakistan relations, afghanistan refugee, afghanistan refugee issue pakistan, Afghanistan refugees, afghanistan refugees in pakistan, afghanistan refugees united nations, afghanistani elections, afghanistani elections 2009, Al Qaeda, al qaeda in pakistan, Al Qaeda Pakistan, democracy in afghanistan, democracy war on terror, deterrence, elections in Afghanistan, India, India Pakistan, india pakistan deterrence, India Pakistan relations, indian media, indian politicians, international affairs in pakistan, intricacies of the afghan election, karzai islamabad, karzai pakistan, Mumbai attacks, NATO, Pakistan, pakistan abdullah abdullah, pakistan afghan election, pakistan afghan relations, pakistan afghanistan, pakistan afghanistan refugees, pakistan interests in afghanistan, Pakistan international affairs, pakistan international relations, pakistan karzai, Pakistan militant, pakistan military, Pakistan refugees, pakistan terrorism, Pakistan war, Pakistan war on terror, pakistani military, pakistans interest in afghan elections, pakistans interest in afghanistan, pakistans military, refugees, soviet afghan war, Taliban, taliban in pakistan, taliban pakistan, terrorism pakistan, terrorist group afghanistan, terrorist groups afghanistan, terrorist groups in pakistan, terrorist groups pakistan, UN pakistan, UN refugee, UNHCR, United Nations, united nations pakistan, united nations refugees pakistan, US Pakistan relations, us war on terror, voting in afghanistan, war in afghanistan, war on terror, war on terror in afghanistan, war on terror pakistan, zainab jeewanjee, Zainab jeewanjee politics | Leave a Comment »
August 18, 2009
Posted in International Affairs | Tagged corruption in pakistan, democracy in pakistan, GEO, jeewanjee, Jinnah, Mr. Jeem, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan, pakistan after 60 years, pakistan corruption, Pakistan economy, pakistan independence, Pakistan media, pakistan since partition, pakistani, pakistani media, Pakistanis, Partition, Qaid, qaid e azam, Quaid-e-Azam, zainab jeewanjee | 1 Comment »
August 18, 2009
“Pakistan Objects to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan War” reads a New York Times article last month updating us on our foreign policy. The article forewarns of “fissures” in the U.S. Pakistan alliance at this critical moment when President Obama sends additional troops to the region. The article specifically outlines Pakistan’s insistence on maintaining forces along the Indian border when the United States expresses concern that the Afghan border is of greater priority. Pakistani officials, to some international dismay, contend that it is more constructive to maintain dialogue with some parts of the Taliban rather than going at the group in an all out military offensive. The piece continues to explain that, sources from the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI: Pakistan’s intelligence agency, their equivalent to our CIA) briefed Special Envoy Holbrooke this morning in their strong concerns of an U.S. “surge” which would “result in more civilian casualties, further alienate local populations. Thus more local resistance to foreign troops”. And while the article continues with how these concerns contrast starkly with U.S. fears that Pakistan is not focusing enough on the Taliban in the north, it is important to revisit the consequences of, and reassess our long-term strategy in Operation Enduring Freedom. Because more of the same may not be an apt solution given that the war is escalating in terms of U.S. costs (on various levels), the region is deteriorating, and prominent experts now claim the effort is doomed to be “unwinnable”.
The fact is, this is the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and where there once was no Al Qaeda or Taliban in the sovereign state of Pakistan, now exists a terribly frightening border through which terrorists are fleeing and situating themselves in the north. Furthermore, it is important to remember that until recently, the Taliban was not considered a terrorist organization, although alarming they were not a military threat before 9/11. Al Qaeda was the main target in Afghanistan, and their presence in Pakistan was minimal, if at all. Since our invasion, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are increasingly difficult to differentiate, and rather than being obliterated, are moving in to Pakistan. And a once ideologically problematic group of Islamic extremists, the Taliban, are now dangerously aligning with far more treacherous terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda.
In a similar way, other regional militant groups are gaining ground as extremist groups evade NATO forces and subsequently weaken our anti-terrorist efforts. The Mumbai atrocities and embassy attacks in Afghanistan last year are testimony to the danger of militant groups advancing their efforts in an increasing climate of instability. This only legitimizes Pakistan’s skepticism of continuing an predominantly military means to combating terrorism. If limited surgical strikes, close intelligence sharing, and consistent provision of anti-terror training and supplies is agreed as effective amongst officials, the U.S. and Pakistan should focus on a “surge” on these fronts.
So when the news paints a clashing picture of interests between Pakistan and the United States, it is a simplistic one. Both states actually have an intense interest in securing the region against terrorists and while they might disagree on tactics, it is important that the Obama administration at least reassess the previous administration’s policies of simply implementing a military “surge”. Even if a surge in troops is potentially successful, working closely to expand on what has proven to be effective is a safer option. So a discerning look at this weeks supposed “fissure” between U.S. and Pakistani officials in discussing cooperation should prompt us to better understand Islamabad’s concerns and perhaps reassess our strategy .
Posted in International Affairs, International Relations, U.S. Politics | Tagged Afghan border, Afghanistan, Afghanistan Pakistan, Afghanistan war, afghanistan war on terror, Al Qaeda Pakistan, CIA, defining the US surge for pakistan, defining us surge, defining us surge for pakistan, instability pakistan, ISI, NATO and pakistan, nato pakistan, new york times, Pakistan, pakistan al qaeda, Pakistan and NATO, pakistan US alliance, Pakistan US cooperation, Pakistan US relations, Pakistan war on terror, Pakistan. US foreign policy, Pakistani intelligence, Surge, surgical strikes pakistan, Taliban, terrorism pakistan, U.S. Surge, uprooting terrorism in pakistan, uprooting terrorism pakistan, US efforts in afghanistan, US efforts in pakistan, US foreign policy, US foreign policy to pakistan, US pakistan alliance, US pakistan cooperation, US Pakistan relations, war on terror, war on terror pakistan, zainab jeewanjee, zainab jeewanjee Pakistan, Zainab jeewanjee politics | Leave a Comment »
August 18, 2009
U.S. Envoy Holbrooke issued a public statement this week acknowledging Pakistan’s “deep rooted” energy problem. He explained that the United States “wanted to send the message that it was concerned about people’s genuine problems”. And the energy problem is in fact among the major problems faced by everyday Pakistanis. In the sweltering summertime, rural areas are faced with prolonged hours of outages, also known as “load shedding” with main cities including the Federal capital suffering 6 to 8 hours daily. This is not only physically unbearable for everyday citizens, but has a profound stalling effect on businesses as it further cripples the already anguished economy. Holbrooke is right then, a genuine attempt to begin resolving the energy crisis would be much welcomed and could in fact help to win the “hearts and minds” of Pakistanis.
This is among the first diplomatic statements issued regarding a funding to help upgrade Pakistan’s power sector and a timeline, or specific details on how such assistance would actually come about were not yet offered. But Pakistani finance minister Shaukat Tarin described in detail how the government could “rent electricity-generating plants over the next three to five years to fill the gap until large-scale energy projects come online and Washington could help by providing financial guarantees to encourage private investment in the sector”. Given the billions of dollars in defense spending Washington has provided Islamabad since 2001, I think Finance Minister Tarin is asking for very, very little here. It would be wise long term strategy for Holbrooke and the Obama Administration to seriously considering delving into this kind of cooperation as it can yield true long term security for the masses of citizens and ultimately, the state.
In addition, Holbrooke announced he would discuss a range of other issues that directly affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis during visit to Karachi on Wednesday. In unison with most diplomatic statements from the United States pertinent to Pakistan these days, Holbrooke’s remarks were overall positive as he expressed confidence in the current democratic regime completing its term and cited a “visible improvement in the political atmosphere” when compared to his past visit.
Amplified cooperation between Washington and Islamabad in combating terrorists is painting a rosy picture of relations these days. News of possible cooperation on funding energy projects is hopeful and on the Pakistani side, Prime Minister Gilani “sought to assuage concerns among western countries about governance and mismanagement issues in Pakistan saying that accountability had been institutionalized”. Many countries are hesitant to allocate funding in fear of a lack of transparency and corruption. But Pakistan has finally addressed this through the first ever independent oversight body: a parliamentary watchdog – Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly who is appointed from the opposition party. This truly is unprecedented and viable move toward democratic processes. It should actually assuage fears to invest in helping Pakistan at this time. An interesting side note here is that this institutionalized, unprecedented oversight comes as a result of the judiciary and media being independent, which is a policy enacted by former General Musharraff as head of state during his tenure.
Finally, the drone attacks continue to be a point of discussion between the U.S. and Pakistan with Gilani reitering that Washington directly provide Islamabad with the technology so not as to further instigate Anti-Americanism in the region through the widespread collateral/civilian damage that the unmanned predator aircrafts inflict.
So it will be interesting to see statements from Washington in the coming weeks on Pakistan. Funding to help resolve the profoundly distressing energy crisis could be a wonderful opportunity for us to offer real aid to Pakistan. Military aid given since 2001 has been real, and can help for security, but if the Obama administration wants to shift from the previous administrations policies and engage in more meaningful solutions, I think winning the hearts and minds through funding projects that directly affect people is in our long term interest of securing the region rather than only focusing on aid to state level institutions for which trickle down can be painfully slow.
Posted in International Affairs, Pakistan, U.S. Politics | Tagged Barack Obama Pakistan, CIA drones pakistan, development in pakistan, drone, drones, drones in Pakistan, education in Pakistan, Energy, energy crisis in pakistan, energy crisis pakistan, energy pakistan, from energy to education pakistan, from energy to education pakistan has a few number one priorities, Holbrooke, holbrooke pakistan, load shedding, load shedding in pakistan, load shedding pakistan, loadshedding, loadshedding in pakistan, loadshedding pakistan, Musharraf, Obama Pakistan, Pakistan, Pakistan Barack Obama, pakistan corruption, pakistan defense spending, pakistan drone attacks, Pakistan energy, Pakistan energy crisis, pakistan energy issues, Pakistan international affairs, pakistan international relations, Pakistan obama, Pakistan US discussions, Pakistan war on terror, special envoy pakistan, special envoy to afghanistan, special envoy to pakistan, US Pakistan discussions, US Pakistan relations, zainab jeewanjee, zainab jeewanjee Pakistan, Zainab jeewanjee politics | 4 Comments »
August 18, 2009
http://www.yaledailynews.com/articles/view/29111
I think a decision to omit the cartoons isn’t necessarily censorship. It treads a very delicate line, but may not cross over into that realm because it might not distort the authors message. Having said that, there isn’t soundness to the recurrent reasoning for omission: that it would inevitably yield a violent response, as the article and some of the quotations in it insist. Reza Aslan thinks the images should not be omitted, perhaps for this reason, or because he finds it is a form of censorship. But leaving the censorship issue aside momentarily, I think the larger issue here is the faulty reasoning. Because a republication of the images does not NECESSARILY yield a violent response (especially if the content is not intended, or aimed to rile controversy). On the contrary it might seek to explain the reasons why such cartoons are harmful, but the article leaves any discussion of the actual content of the book out, which is surprising. All we know is that the book is about the “Cartoons that shook the world”, we are given no further details on the concept, thesis or which direction the author takes in respect to the cartoons.
I suppose if I were in the position of editing/publishing a work like this, i might opt to omit hurtful images if they severely trample on religious sensitivities more so than demonstrate a constructive thesis on my part. Emphasis on “more so” and I would also take into account the relevance to my audience. But If the images are necessary in furthering a productive debate, then keep them in. Again however, the actual content of the book in question isn’t touched upon in the article.
This makes the article irresponsible and problematic by relying on a false premise that Muslims all over the world (remember they cleverly quote international Muslim Ambassadors) are a homogenous bunch of religious persons who are definitely going to respond violently to the republication of those cartoons. That’s a gross over simplification and sweeping generalization, It also completely ignores how significant factors of the books audience or intent for the republication can affect responses.
In the end, shouldn’t there be some stifling of very relevant, and critical information, or a distortion of information in some way for us to call an omission of offensive material censorship? If the images aren’t critical to the authors thesis, there’s little reason to include offensive material unless for trivial shock value. So critics claiming Yale is being “cowardly” need to more closely examine what a republication of such images really brings toward generating substantial debate on the issue at hand. Because otherwise they’re just whining against a tactful, harmless omission.
Posted in Religion & Society | Tagged blasphemous cartoons, blasphemy, cartoon debate, cartoon Muhammad, censorship, censorship danish cartoon, censorship danish cartoons, censorship islam, censorship islam cartoons, censorship muslim, censorship muslim cartoons, Danish cartoon, Danish Cartoons, Islam, Islam censorship, Islamic, Islamic Prophet, muhammad cartoons violence, Muslim, Muslim censorship, Muslim protests, Muslim violence cartoons, Muslims protest, Muslims violence cartoons, Prophet Muhammad, reza aslan, Yale, yale bans image of mohammad, yale bans image of muhammad, yale bans image of prophet, Yale bans images of islamic prophet, yale bans images of mohammad, yale bans images of muhammad, yale bans images of Muslim Prophet, yale bans images of prophet, zainab jeewanjee, zainab jeewanjee islam, zainab jeewanjee muslim, zainab jeewanjee religion, zainab yale bans images of prophet | Leave a Comment »
Zainab B. Jeewanjee
Zainab Jeewanjee 