Archive for the ‘International Relations’ Category
August 27, 2009
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, better known as the founder of Pakistan when India was divided in 1947 is making headlines today with controversy surrounding ex-Indian Parliamentarian Jaswant Singh’s recent book: India – Partition – Independence. Immediately following the books release, Singh was expelled from his position in the Bhartiya Janata (BJP) party, protests wherein the book was burned and a prompt ban on the work in Gujarat ensued. But why the uproar?
In a recent interview, Singh reveals the following views on Jinnah that are now apparently too controversial in India, but receiving mostly praise across Pakistan:
- Jinnah was an Indian nationalist
- He joined the Indian Congress party before the Muslim League implying an original loyalty to a United India and eventual shift to non secularism as a result of Congress party politics later
- Jinnah fought the British for an Independent India, in tandem with fighting “resolutely and relentlessly” for Muslim rights in India
- Jinnah is admirable for being a self made man, having created a position in politics for himself without the luxury of prior wealth or status
- Jinnah was not anti-Hindu
- Jinnah failed insofar as he received a “moth eaten” piece of divided India in the form of Pakistan and left Muslims who stayed back in India without sufficient guidance
- Gandhi himself referred to Jinnah as a great Indian, so there should be no controversy in recognizing him as such today
- Muslims in India today are downtrodden, live in pain and are “robbed of the essence of psychological security”
- Both Indian Muslims and Pakistani’s have paid a price for Partition since both would have been stronger under a united India
To those who have not grown up or spent much time in South Asia, it may be difficult to understand why such ideas can be controversial and strike such polar chords in the hearts and minds of people divided by a man made border only 60 years ago. But the division of India, into two states resulting in an independent Pakistan saw extreme violence, mass refugee migration and that carnage left a lasting scar on South Asian mindsets. Put in a most blunt form: India suffered the bitter taste of a fractured state that is rooted among the great civilizations in history. And Pakistan suffered the bitter reality of as Singh put it, “a moth eaten”, post colonial state with perhaps an inevitably fractured and frail territory from inception. From the bizarre geopolitical landscape of Bangladesh not contingent to, yet officially part of Pakistan to the conflict over Kashmir at the very onset of partition, Singh makes a fair point in explaining partition caused profound suffering on both ends. The subsequent bitterness is manifest in perpetual hostility between both states in the form of conflicts, and in India, even on a communal level where according to Singh, Muslims are still downtrodden.
So praising Jinnah as a “great man” in India may be akin to condoning the very fracturing of India. In Pakistan, it’s lauded as an admission that their founder heroically created a homeland where Muslims would no longer be downtrodden. Singh’s work also might acknowledge that partition dealt an unfair hand to Pakistani’s, an idea that can come across as unpalatable on the Indian side. But relying on interviews from Jaswant Singh on the book so far, I think the controversy is a tired insinuation of hostility from the state. Banning the book on the grounds that:
“the text in it is misleading for the public and against interest of the state, and therefore, the book must be forfeited and prohibited”
only fuels a hostile polarization of India and Pakistan. Mind you, India and Pakistan as states are increasingly polarized, which in turn results in a division of peoples. Because my guess is that had government kept its hands out of censoring Singh’s book it might have spoken to the hearts and minds of South Asian’s disseminating novel ideas that are not divisive. Noam Chomsky once said that “states are violent institutions”, in South Asia, at the very least they are bitter, but people inherently are not. Singh’s work might have tapped into that sentiment and in the banning of it, states tighten their grip on citizens by perpetuating division and hostility in South Asia. Against a backdrop of a desire for economic growth, stability and globalization, that kind of bitterness is stale 60 odd years later. So I’m looking forward to reading the book and am lucky that my copy was reserved before the ban, in safe hands far from from protests and government intervention.
Posted in Current Affairs, India Pakistan, International Affairs, International Relations, South Asia | Tagged 1947, banning jaswant singh, banning jaswants book, book controversy india, book on jinnah ban, book on jinnah banned, chomsky, divided India, gandhi, gandhi jinnah, globalization, globalization india, globalization india pakistan, globalization pakistan, India, india independence, india jinnah, India Pakistan, india pakistan 1947, india pakistan independence, india pakistan partition, India Pakistan relations, india partition independence, indo pak relations, jaswant singh, jaswant singh BJP book, jaswant singh BJP expel, jaswant singh book, jaswant singh book ban, jaswant singh book jinnah, jaswant singh book pakistan, jaswant singh controversy, jaswant singh controversy india, jaswant singh expelled, jaswant singh interview, jaswant singh jinnah, jaswant singh pakistan, Jinnah, jinnah a great man jaswant singh, jinnah book ban, jinnah book banned, jinnah book banned in india, jinnah fought british, jinnah founder of pakistan, jinnah gandhi, jinnah india, jinnah indian nationalist, jinnah nationalist, jinnah pakistan jaswant singh, jinnah partition, jinnah partition india, kashmir partition, muslim league jinnah, noam chomsky, Pakistan, pakistan independence, pakistan india, pakistan india partition, Pakistan international affairs, pakistan international relations, Partition, partition 1947, partition jinnah india, zainab jeewanjee | 3 Comments »
August 26, 2009
Former leaders from Ayub Khan, Benazir Bhutto, and General Musharraf tried to address the issue of growing energy consumption and diminishing supplies which is now legitimately deemed a “crisis” in Pakistan. President Zardari had his hand in addressing the crisis last week during the quarterly visit to Beijing where he discussed China’s assistance on energy projects. The result is a signed Memorandum of Understanding between both states for the construction of the Bunji dam in the Astore district of Pakistan. Pakistani Ambassador to China, Masood Khan confirmed this dam is one of 8 slotted for priority construction and will have a capacity of generating 7,000 megawatts of electricity. Additionally, Presdient Zardari visited the ambitious Three Gorges Dam and met with Solar Power companies in China this year and enthusiastically invited them to carry out feasibility studies and expertise:
“We need solar power for individual housing units and I want the Chinese to carry out a study in Pakistan,”
As a result, Chinese owned Solar Energy Science and Technology Company expressed a readiness to construct solar power generation projects. Many dams and solar projects targeting the northern areas that are relatively underdeveloped and fairly detached from national infrastructure. But despite being underdeveloped, the region is prime location for generating hydro power and NGO’s have in the past introduced small, community based hydro power stations where usage is limited to basic lighting for residences and had little capacity to produce energy required for income generation. Last weeks deal with China on the other hand might be a more viable route to progress. A case study from India in 2001 demonstrates how an entrepreneur in Chitral installed a “one megawatt hydel power project that changed the socio-economic conditions of the area by providing electricity to run machinery for the manufacturing and processing of local goods. Locally-generated energy then created skilled job opportunities in the power supply system and in workshops for making electric appliances and fixing electric installations.
Applying such construction to the northern areas of Pakistan as per recent deals with China have the potential to spur similar growth. Localized hydel projects with Chinese expertise can bypass a need for more macro transmission and distribution costs involved with creating larger infrastructure. Time and money are saved if large scale distribution channels to transmit power are not needed. And because the energy produced would be confined to the area of consumption more expensive centralized power generation and large scale load issues may be avoided.
Plus, Hydropower is cost effective and solar power has fair potential in Pakistan because of the warm climate.
And with Chinese companies already having begun work on various hydel projects, including the Neelum Jhelum, Gomal Zam and Mangla Rising constructions, President Zardari said he was:
“personally monitoring all ongoing projects being carried out by Chinese engineers and experts in Pakistan, adding that he was holding regular meetings with Chinese ambassador in Islamabad”
So colorful history aside, President Zardari is one of the few, if not first true businessmen turned leaders of Pakistan and it will be great to see the success of his recent bilateral negotiations with China translate to a lasting alleviation of the energy crisis.
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Posted in Current Affairs, International Affairs, International Relations, Pakistan | Tagged Asif Zardari, asif zardari business man, Bunji dam, china energy assistance, china funding energy, china pakistan cooperation, chinese dams, Chinese Pakistani relations, energy assistance to pakistan, energy crisis pakistan, energy pakistan, hydel, hydel pakistan, hydel power in pakistan, hydel project, hydropower, hydropower in pakistan, hydropower pakistan, massod khan, Pakistan, pakistan ambassador, Pakistan China, pakistan china cooperation, pakistan china relations, Pakistan Chinese relations, Pakistan dam, Pakistan dams, Pakistan energy, Pakistan energy crisis, pakistan foreign minister, Pakistan hydel, Pakistan hydel China, Pakistan hydel construction, Pakistan hydel project, Pakistan hydropower, Pakistan hydropower construction, pakistan hydropower energy, Pakistan international affairs, pakistan international relations, Pakistans energy crisis, President Asif Zardari, Sino Pak relations, zainab jeewanjee, zardari business, zardari business dealings, zardari businesses, Zardari China, Zardari dam, Zardari hydel, Zardari hydropower | 29 Comments »
August 23, 2009
No explanation can adequately address the horrors carried out in Gojra Pakistan. But these horrors are newsworthy and have potential to serve as a lesson in uprooting such inhumanity. Rather than focusing squarely and vaguely on vast historical causation that might allow factions to commit these horrors, a closer look at multifaceted ways in which to uproot that causation by drawing on recent history is valuable.
Because in some ways recent events are repetitive of the country’s history of cyclical, civilian to military governance. Just over half of 62 years of Pakistani statehood have been spent under martial law (which is bizarre, though not entirely as alarming as it sounds). Civilian regimes have been notoriously corrupt and did little to bring about democracy when scrutinized beyond the cover of a “civlian” title. Given this backdrop and our long engagement with Islamabad, Washington’s lenses should be discerning when dealing with Pakistan. But events like Gojra, the Mumbai atrocities and relentless, daily plight Pakistan’s military and civilians face in uprooting terror from in and around their borders, consistently begs the question: what is still going wrong?
If we draw on recent events for explanation, there is one consistency: Since the War on Terror began, Pakistan was most stable under Musharraf with respect to security and international standing and since his departure, the economy is deteriorating.
Correlating these successes to Msuharraf’s tenure might come across as reductive, but it is tangible. Thus, to better formulate our strategy in Pakistan given the luxury of hindsight, it could be useful to revisit Musharraf’s policies by way of dispelling vociferous censures that follow him until now:
As a military leader Musharraf’s governance deepened the cycle of martial law ultimately not allowing a democracy to take shape in Pakistan:
- Not necessarily: South Asian policy expert Anatol Lieven explains “All civilian governments have been guilty of corruption, election rigging and the imprisonment or murder of political opponents, in some cases to a worse degree than the military administrations that followed.” And the pool from which to select leaders post Musharraf offered little hope for anything different. Alternative options were extensions of the very leadership Lieven explains. They offered dynastic governance (Benazir Bhutto as daughter of Zulfiqar Bhutto) or perpetual subversion of democracy through maintaining a feudal system (Asif Zardari). In fact, the feudal system wherein masses of uneducated Pakistani’s are bound to a servile existence is what causes this kind of aristocracy to reign. This rampant subversion of Pakistani citizenry is a far cry from democracy.
- Musharraf indirectly addressed this by privatizing news media. This profoundly affected everyday Pakistani’s by spurring, fresh news, views, ideas, occupations and attention independent of state censorship and interest. Something I took for granted until spending time in Karachi before Musharraf’s tenure (especially under Sharif’s government). If anti- Americanism was a problem in Pakistan, Sharif’s rigid and religious driven censorship of television, and print media certainly did not help while Musharraf’s policies, did.
- On a side note: although media privatization is eclipsed by other news out of Pakistan in the past few years, I cite this as Musharraf’s crowning achievement. I maintain that its effects will have lasting impact on ultimately allowing a viable democracy to take shape in Pakistan by way of a meaningful dissemination of independent and increasingly globalized information.
Musharraf should not be credited with the economic growth because it was driven by foreign support funds from the War on Terror which would have been collected from cooperation by any Pakistani government in power at the time:
- Also while investments were “paternalistic” during martial law, economic growth actually did, “trickle down” as was seen in major cities. A more modernized standard of living through increased consumption and access to products reflected this economic expansion amongst all levels in society. For the first time in Karachi, I saw hired help, including chauffeurs who are part of the working class carrying cell phones and purchasing American DVD’s. Women were increasingly seen occupying positions in the financial sector and politics. So military paternalism, is sadly more productive than the civilian corruption that takes place because it means funds are at least circulated domestically, rather than driven out of the country entirely.
Now I’m not equating these specific instances of consumption and progress necessarily to full-fledged support of Musharraf, nor am I making a case for permanent military rule in Pakistan or condoning military corruption. However, such tangible developments amidst unfounded criticism and the reality of Pakistan’s history should inform Washington. A senior fellow on South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations perhaps prescribed this best in 2007:
Musharraf offers Washington continuity in the face of uncertain political transition. He is a familiar face, a leader with whom the Bush administration has established a sustained working relationship. Under even the smoothest possible transition scenarios, Musharraf’s departure would interrupt bilateral cooperation on military, counterterrorism, and intelligence matters for days or weeks—with uncertain consequences for U.S. security
In hindsight, this assessment is quite apt. Musharraf was an ally who provided results and continued to successfully expand our efforts in the War on Terror. Not just for U.S. interests, but for Pakistani interests in security and development. Had Musharraf not fired the Supreme Court judges and declared the state of emergency that wound up dismissing further justices, he might have maintained his leadership that is needed in Pakistan at this time. And I hope the Obama Administration takes this recent history into close consideration when formulating our ongoing cooperation with leaders in Islamabad.
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Posted in International Affairs, International Relations | Tagged Anatol Lieven, Benazir Bhutto, Bhutto, civilian government in pakistan, civilian government pakistan, civilian military rule in pakistan, civilian rule in pakistan, democracy in pakistan, democracy musharraf, democracy pakistan, democratization in pakistan, General Musharraf, general pervez musharraf, Gojra, Gojra Pakistan, martial law in pakistan, martial law pakistan, military governance in pakistan, military rule in pakistan, military rule pakistan, Musharraf, musharraf and democracy, musharraf in hindsight, musharraf zainab jeewanjee, Mushy sahib, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan, pakistan corruption, Pakistan democracy, Pakistan economy, Pakistan leader, pakistan martial law, Pakistan media, pakistan military, Pakistan military leader, Pakistan president, Pakistan prime minister, Pervez Musharraf, US Pakistan relations, war on terror, zainab jeewanjee | 13 Comments »
August 21, 2009
Polls opened today in Afghanistan with Washington watching closely in hopes that elections are peaceful and leave a lasting mark of democracy for future state building. Pakistan has the same interest on perhaps an even more immediate level. Successful elections in Afghanistan are an integral ingredient to Pakistan’s domestic offensive in uprooting dangerous factions, expanding the economy, nurturing their democracy and stabilizing relations with neighbors. But if a candidate does not receive at least 50% of votes in this first round, “elections are pushed into a second, more unpredictable round of voting“. And second round elections might agitate an already rickety political climate amidst apprehensions of violence, which is entirely detrimental for Pakistan given domestic and regional circumstances right now.
On the domestic front, Pakistan’s military continues to make progress against dangerous groups. Weakened by the death (and or disappearance) of leader Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban in Pakistan “seems to be in disarray”. Meaning Islamabad’s offensive against factions this year are bearing fruits for the War on Terror and shifting toward more stability, hopefully for the long term. But if elections in Afghanistan are pushed to a second round, weeks of political irresolution can allow terrorist groups a climate of uncertainty within which to recuperate from losses and cause turmoil. Which since 2001 has shown that a dangerous spillover effect exists wherein Afghani militant groups shift in to Pakistan harboring themselves into the nebulous, virtually imperturbable border.
Broader regional considerations also factor into Pakistan’s hopes for stable elections. The spillover of militant groups since 9/11 intensifies Pakistan’s long desired interest in seeing a democratic, stable Afghanistan where refugees may repatriate. In fact,Pakistan hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world, an underreported story that actually helps explain why dangerous factions were able to develop in Pakistan. Millions of devastated Afghans, some armed and many destitute from fighting Soviets in the 1980’s found refuge from their war ravaged country in Pakistan. A mostly destitute population seeking refuge in a developing country with highly volatile political circumstances allowed violent sectarian and religiously extremist factions to exploit and recruit refugees to their cause. In addition, there are heavy economic costs for Pakistan in maintaining such a large number of refugees. Since last years military escalation in Afghanistan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees explains that there is around 2 to 2.1 million Afghani Refugees now living in Pakistan. He said the United Nations planned to launch an emergency appeal for hundreds of millions of dollars needed to sustain refugees that have come in just this past year. So peaceful elections in a first round that move Afghanistan in a direction of democratic stability is integral to Pakistan’s security: they relieve Islamabad of a very costly responsibility to a long-standing refugee challenge.
Although some minority, yet raucous opinions say elections ushering democratic authority are not in Islamabad’s interest because they “diminish Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan”. Thus suggesting policymakers are strategically motivated to prevent losing an allegedly malleable buffer zone that Afghanistan serves against India. It’s an unlikely, poorly reasoned notion. It attempts to be qualified by citing Islamabad’s insistence on uprooting domestic militant/fundamentalist groups, so as to avoid confrontation with a supposed malleable buffer forces. But expecting policy makers to divert efforts from turmoil at home to external threats is a laughable assertion. Before taking care of neighboring militant groups whose primary focus is not on fighting Pakistanis, Islamabad legitimately devotes resources to uprooting domestic factions who pose an immediate threat. Suicide bombings have become an almost weekly recurrence in Pakistan and with that level of instability, faulting Pakistan for not doing enough to uproot neighboring terror is outrageous. Plus, NATO forces and amplified American presence in Afghanistan furthers the absurdity of such calls for Pakistan to ignore turmoil at home and focus on Afghanistan. And neither of these allegations logically indicate a Pakistani motivation for instability so as to use Afghanistan as a buffer zone.
But perhaps the most unreasonable way of supporting a notion that Pakistan lacks interest in successful elections refers to relations with India. Specifically, that Islamabad’s refusal to remove forces from the Indian border despite current spillover from Afghanistan indicates an excessive concern with an Indian threat. A few reasons why this is incorrect: firstly, referring again to amplified U.S. and current NATO presence and given an abundance of domestic threats that require Islamabad’s attention, removing troops from the Indian border to the Afghan border does little to help Pakistan now, (especially weighted against the risks of doing so). Secondly, even if troops from were redeployed, those forces are squarely trained/equipped to face a potential Indian threat, not in counterterrorism. Which became well known much to Washington’s dismay with the military’s many unsuccessful attempts at uprooting militants from the northern regions along the Afghan border.
Finally, a refusal to redeploy forces is not because of an excessive concern given the reality of current Indian-Pakistani relations. The Mumbai atrocities occurred less than a year ago and the aftermath saw a speedy, vehement escalation of tensions. Some Indian media and politicians fanned the flames, and when tensions rise between India and Pakistan, the world gets nervous. By way of a counterfactual, we can tie how these tensions relate to justifying Islamabad’s decision to maintain troops on the border: If, God Forbid, another atrocity took place on Indian soil since 11/26/08 and Pakistan had redeployed troops away from the border. The result could be an even further escalation of tensions. A terrifying potential for confrontation ensues and Pakistan’s capacity to defend against an already far more immense Indian force is drastically diminished. Which itself has a potential to cause hasty, over offensive beahvior from either side. Basic lessons in Realism thus teach us that redeployment away from the Indian border is out of the question. Given history, and sensitive circumstances since 11/26 I think military strategy might advise the same. Thus from a Pakistani policymakers point of view, troops on the Indian border is a legitimate priority. If anything, one might even argue they deter confrontation.
So, allegations that Islamabad is not sufficiently committed to stable election processes in Afghanistan are just not reasonable. If anything, successful elections relieve Pakistan of deep social and economic costs through refugee repatriation. And from the Mumbai atrocities to countless civilians who suffer daily from terror and a climate of instability that allows violent factions to operate, a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan beginning with successful elections is very much in Pakistan’s interest.
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Posted in International Affairs, International Relations | Tagged 2009 election afghanistan, 2009 elections for afghanistan, 2009 elections in afghanistan, af-pak cooperation, af-pak region, af-pak relations, af-pak strategy, af-pak taliban, af-pak terrorism, af-pak war, af-pak war on terror, afghan buffer zone, afghan election, afghan election 2009, Afghan elections, afghan pakistan relations, Afghan refugees, afghan refugees in pakistan, afghan refugees united nations, afghani election 2009, afghani refugees, afghani refugees in pakistan, afghanistan buffer zone, afghanistan election abdullah, afghanistan election karzai, afghanistan elections, afghanistan elections 2009, afghanistan elections pakistan, afghanistan militants, afghanistan pakistan relations, afghanistan refugee, afghanistan refugee issue pakistan, Afghanistan refugees, afghanistan refugees in pakistan, afghanistan refugees united nations, afghanistani elections, afghanistani elections 2009, Al Qaeda, al qaeda in pakistan, Al Qaeda Pakistan, democracy in afghanistan, democracy war on terror, deterrence, elections in Afghanistan, India, India Pakistan, india pakistan deterrence, India Pakistan relations, indian media, indian politicians, international affairs in pakistan, intricacies of the afghan election, karzai islamabad, karzai pakistan, Mumbai attacks, NATO, Pakistan, pakistan abdullah abdullah, pakistan afghan election, pakistan afghan relations, pakistan afghanistan, pakistan afghanistan refugees, pakistan interests in afghanistan, Pakistan international affairs, pakistan international relations, pakistan karzai, Pakistan militant, pakistan military, Pakistan refugees, pakistan terrorism, Pakistan war, Pakistan war on terror, pakistani military, pakistans interest in afghan elections, pakistans interest in afghanistan, pakistans military, refugees, soviet afghan war, Taliban, taliban in pakistan, taliban pakistan, terrorism pakistan, terrorist group afghanistan, terrorist groups afghanistan, terrorist groups in pakistan, terrorist groups pakistan, UN pakistan, UN refugee, UNHCR, United Nations, united nations pakistan, united nations refugees pakistan, US Pakistan relations, us war on terror, voting in afghanistan, war in afghanistan, war on terror, war on terror in afghanistan, war on terror pakistan, zainab jeewanjee, Zainab jeewanjee politics | Leave a Comment »
August 18, 2009
“Pakistan Objects to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan War” reads a New York Times article last month updating us on our foreign policy. The article forewarns of “fissures” in the U.S. Pakistan alliance at this critical moment when President Obama sends additional troops to the region. The article specifically outlines Pakistan’s insistence on maintaining forces along the Indian border when the United States expresses concern that the Afghan border is of greater priority. Pakistani officials, to some international dismay, contend that it is more constructive to maintain dialogue with some parts of the Taliban rather than going at the group in an all out military offensive. The piece continues to explain that, sources from the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI: Pakistan’s intelligence agency, their equivalent to our CIA) briefed Special Envoy Holbrooke this morning in their strong concerns of an U.S. “surge” which would “result in more civilian casualties, further alienate local populations. Thus more local resistance to foreign troops”. And while the article continues with how these concerns contrast starkly with U.S. fears that Pakistan is not focusing enough on the Taliban in the north, it is important to revisit the consequences of, and reassess our long-term strategy in Operation Enduring Freedom. Because more of the same may not be an apt solution given that the war is escalating in terms of U.S. costs (on various levels), the region is deteriorating, and prominent experts now claim the effort is doomed to be “unwinnable”.
The fact is, this is the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and where there once was no Al Qaeda or Taliban in the sovereign state of Pakistan, now exists a terribly frightening border through which terrorists are fleeing and situating themselves in the north. Furthermore, it is important to remember that until recently, the Taliban was not considered a terrorist organization, although alarming they were not a military threat before 9/11. Al Qaeda was the main target in Afghanistan, and their presence in Pakistan was minimal, if at all. Since our invasion, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are increasingly difficult to differentiate, and rather than being obliterated, are moving in to Pakistan. And a once ideologically problematic group of Islamic extremists, the Taliban, are now dangerously aligning with far more treacherous terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda.
In a similar way, other regional militant groups are gaining ground as extremist groups evade NATO forces and subsequently weaken our anti-terrorist efforts. The Mumbai atrocities and embassy attacks in Afghanistan last year are testimony to the danger of militant groups advancing their efforts in an increasing climate of instability. This only legitimizes Pakistan’s skepticism of continuing an predominantly military means to combating terrorism. If limited surgical strikes, close intelligence sharing, and consistent provision of anti-terror training and supplies is agreed as effective amongst officials, the U.S. and Pakistan should focus on a “surge” on these fronts.
So when the news paints a clashing picture of interests between Pakistan and the United States, it is a simplistic one. Both states actually have an intense interest in securing the region against terrorists and while they might disagree on tactics, it is important that the Obama administration at least reassess the previous administration’s policies of simply implementing a military “surge”. Even if a surge in troops is potentially successful, working closely to expand on what has proven to be effective is a safer option. So a discerning look at this weeks supposed “fissure” between U.S. and Pakistani officials in discussing cooperation should prompt us to better understand Islamabad’s concerns and perhaps reassess our strategy .
Posted in International Affairs, International Relations, U.S. Politics | Tagged Afghan border, Afghanistan, Afghanistan Pakistan, Afghanistan war, afghanistan war on terror, Al Qaeda Pakistan, CIA, defining the US surge for pakistan, defining us surge, defining us surge for pakistan, instability pakistan, ISI, NATO and pakistan, nato pakistan, new york times, Pakistan, pakistan al qaeda, Pakistan and NATO, pakistan US alliance, Pakistan US cooperation, Pakistan US relations, Pakistan war on terror, Pakistan. US foreign policy, Pakistani intelligence, Surge, surgical strikes pakistan, Taliban, terrorism pakistan, U.S. Surge, uprooting terrorism in pakistan, uprooting terrorism pakistan, US efforts in afghanistan, US efforts in pakistan, US foreign policy, US foreign policy to pakistan, US pakistan alliance, US pakistan cooperation, US Pakistan relations, war on terror, war on terror pakistan, zainab jeewanjee, zainab jeewanjee Pakistan, Zainab jeewanjee politics | Leave a Comment »
Zainab B. Jeewanjee
Zainab Jeewanjee 