Posts Tagged ‘Afghanistan’
October 13, 2009
Pakistani forces are in full offensive mode today, bombing northern areas of South Waziristan. Although planned months in advance, this comes immediately following a siege at military headquarters, and a number of suicide attacks for which Taliban have claimed responsibility. Simultaneously, the Kerry-Lugar Bill elicits concern that contingencies on funding potentially violate sovereignty, US controlled drone attacks continue and the economy has yet to pick up. Needless to say, the War on Terror have been tough times for Pakistan, and I hope the military succeeds in securing northern areas swiftly.
But an interesting perspective that is perhaps overshadowed by statistics, strategies, and tangible costs/benefits of our engagement in Operation Enduring Freedom, are the multifaceted issues of Pakistan’s agenda, which should describe handling security breaches at the forefront of their interests.
The Christian Science Monitor has a piece entitled “Pakistan Taliban Bombing Spree Could spur Backlash” reporting on today’s military offensive, but the thrust is that the Taliban siege at military headquarters “spurs” Pakistani forces to fight harder, and stronger against the Taliban. By attributing an increased fight to the “backlash” of this weekends attacks, the article rests on an implied assumption that Pakistan would otherwise have made suboptimal efforts at obliterating terrorists. At the end of the article an alternative view is offered by a security analyst at the INternational Institute for Strategic Studies in London explaining:
“I don’t think any serious military is baited in that way. It will certainly annoy the military intensely and strengthen resolve, but the South Waziristan operation – which will inevitably occur at some point – isn’t going to be accelerated just because of this.”
But this is an external analysts view and the article is preceded by a statement from a Pakistani professor:
“By launching these attacks on the very citadel and symbol of the Pakistani Army they have just crossed a red line, and there is no turning back as far as the Pakistani Army is concerned. I think they will be made to pay for it.”
Certainly, a brazen attack on military headquarters will rile a staunch response. But the articles title still suggests that the siege fuels the military offensive rather than an inherent interest in combatting terrorism.
This idea is an extension of what is now a widespread misperception that Pakistan is not entirely interested in combating terrorism, when on the contrary, this weeks offensive reaffirms Pakistan’s struggle for security. And I wonder if the skeptical lens with which reports question Pakistan’s effort stem from a stage set for discourse back in 2001 when former President George Bush decided countries were simply “either with us, or against us”.
The effectiveness of that strategy is debatable, but 8 years later it doesn’t offer sufficient explanations for allies like Pakistan who work “with us”, yet face persistent accusations of not doing enough. Because this weekend’s siege on military headquarters indicates Pakistan’s inherent interest in uprooting terrorism, but without a comprehensive reading into the situation it’s easy to have only a “with or against us” understanding. The northern areas where Afghani militants have spilled over is an autonomous region, historically beyond the realm of federal authority. Yet its inhabitants share with greater Pakistan a similar culture, ascribe to the same religion (although interpretations vary), and even share a physical resemblance making it a very sensitive area where any state would use force only as a final resort. Militarily obliterating such an area is unpalatable to the general Pakistani public and therefore a difficult issue to deal with for policymakers. In addition, Pakistan’s forces are only 60+ years old and trained predominantly in conventional warfare to face a potential Indian threat.
Thus, there are extremely sensitive considerations and multiple dimensions in the Pakistani approach to dealing with terrorism that since 2001, is an increasingly domestic battle. Just militarily obliterating this kind of demographic is not only potentially destabilizing for Pakistan, but is impractical without additional funding, training, and intelligence sharing with our forces. So Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States is not a black or white, “with us or against us” situation. The Obama administration understands this as if applies General McChrystal’s recommendations to differentiate Taliban from Al Qaeda as targets in the War on Terror. Such practicality takes into considerations long term realities and sensitivities of the region as cooperation in our War on Terror looks increasingly domestic for Pakistan.
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Posted in Current Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, International Relations, Pakistan, U.S. Politics, Uncategorized, US Foreign Polciy, US Pakistan relations | Tagged af-pak, af-pak war, afghan pakistan, Afghanistan, afghanistan pakistan border, afghanistan pakistan taliban, afghanistan pakistan terrorism, afghanistan terrorism, Al Qaeda, al qaeda in NwFP, al qaeda in the NWfP, Al Qaeda Pakistan, bush with us or against us, christian science monitor pakistan, christian science monitor pakistan article, domestic issues in pakistan, domestic terror pakistan, domestic terrorism in pakistan, foreign policy pakistan, foreign policy to pakistan, International Affairs, International Affairs Pakistan, international politics, international politics in pakistan, international relations pakistan, jeewanjee, NWFP taliban, NWFP terrorism, obama war on terror, pakistan agenda, pakistan domestic issues, pakistan fighting terrorism, pakistan fights terrorism, pakistan foreign policy, pakistan international relations, pakistan military, pakistan military attack, pakistan political affairs, pakistan politics, pakistan terrorism, Pakistan US cooperation, Pakistan war on terror, Pakistan war on terror efforts, pakistan waziristan, pakistani foreign policy, pakistani military, pakistani politics, pakistani taliban, pakistans military, political affairs of pakistan, politics in pakistan, politics of pakistan, politics pakistan, president obama foreign policy, Taliban, taliban afghanistan pakistan, taliban attack against pakistan, taliban attack on pakistan, taliban attack pakistan, taliban in afghanistan, taliban in north of pakistan, taliban in northern pakistan, taliban in NWFP, taliban in pakistan, taliban NwFP, terrorism in pakistan, terrorism pakistan, war on terror in pakistan, war on terror NWFP, war on terror obama, waziristan al qaeda, waziristan pakistan terrorism, waziristan taliban, waziristan terrorism, with us against us bush, with us or against us, zainab jeewanjee, zainab jeewanjee foreign policy, Zainab jeewanjee politics | 6 Comments »
October 9, 2009
After months of consideration on how to deal with our escalating engagement in the AF-Pak region, Obama’s administration has decided:
“the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a political or military movement”
An article in the Washington Post today cites the administrations re-vamped goal of mitigating a Taliban capacity to interfere in the establishment of a stable Afghan government while assuring us that Al Qaeda is the primary threat, and our strategy will focus squarely on eradicating them.
It seemed news on Pakistan in the past year revolved around Islamabad not doing enough to eradicate the Taliban; equating the group to Al Qaeda in terms of importance in the War on Terror. But today marks a clear departure from such criticism. Distinguishing Al Qaeda from the Taliban is a huge step forward for the United States. Because connecting our goals to eliminate both immediate security threats and major elements of Afghan society that are unpalatable to our values, has proven counter productive. Having lived in Pakistan to experience the ill effects of hyper conservative religious factions, I know we mean well in trying to uproot extremism, but it just hasn’t worked in tandem with our military offensive. And I’ve mentioned the importance of a distinction between these groups previously:
The Taliban is historically distinct from militant groups like Al Qaeda. Unlike the Taliban, Al Qaeda is directly responsible for 9/11. Simply put, the Taliban was an ideologically fundamental group, while Al Qaeda is a militant, terrorist group. Both are dangerous as such, but the Taliban has national interests in controlling Afghanistan under strict ideological rules while Al Qaeda is a militant organization with international ambitions.
It’s not a novel contention, but only just being reflected in policy, and I think it has potential for success. As an ideological force, the Taliban foster an ultra conservative brand of Islam, but are not necessarily a threat to our security interests. Plus, if General McChrystal’s goal is defined as establishing a sustainable, democratic Afghan government, in order for it to be considered legitimate, it must be rooted in Afghan values and according to Afghan preferences. Such preferences might seem backward, or entirely unpleasant to us, but so long as our interests are being protected, impressing our brand of democratic values should take a back seat for the time being. I think the Obama administration has taken a wise step in revamping the Af-Pak strategy and hope it yields lasting success.
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Posted in Current Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, International Relations, U.S. Politics, US Foreign Polciy | Tagged af-pak strategy, af-pak war, af-pak war on terror, Afghanistan, Afghanistan Pakistan, afghanistan pakistan politics, afghanistan taliban, afghanistan taliban politics, afghanistan war on terror, afpak, afpak war, Al Qaeda, al qaeda in pakistan, Al Qaeda Pakistan, al qaeda tailban, al qaeda taliban difference, al qaeda terrorism, al qaeda war on terror, alqaeda afghanistan, difference between al qaeda and talian, difference between al qaeda taliban, fighting al qaeda, fighting taliban, fighting the taliban in afghanistan, foreign policy to pakistan, general mcchrystal afghanistan, general mcchrystal afghanistan pakistan strategy, general mcchrystal military strategy, general mcchrystal obama strategy, general mcchrystal obama war on terror, general mcchrystal pakistan, general mcchrystal war on terror, International Affairs, International Affairs Pakistan, international politics, international politics in pakistan, international relations pakistan, mcchrystal af-pak, mcchrystal afghanistan, mcchrystal obama, mcchrystal on pakistan, mcchrystal pakistan, mcchrystal war on terror, obama afghanistan war on terror, obama led war on terror in afghanistan, obama troop surge, obama troops in afghanistan, obama us war on terror, obama war on terror, obama war on terror in afghanistan, obama war on terror in pakistan, obama war on terror pakistan, pakistan affairs., pakistan foreign policy, pakistan international relations, pakistan obama war on terror, pakistan political affairs, pakistan politics, pakistan taliban, pakistani, pakistani foreign policy, pakistani politics, pakistani taliban, pakistans foreign policy, political affairs of pakistan, politics in pakistan, politics of pakistan, politics pakistan, taliban afghanistan, taliban al qaeda, taliban eliminated, taliban in afghanistan, taliban in afghanistan and pakistan, taliban in pakistan, taliban in the war on terror, taliban pakistan, the difference between al qaeda and the taliban, US foreign policy to pakistan, us led war on terror afghanistan, us led war on terror pakistan, us troops in afghanistan, us troops war on terror, us war on terror taliban, war on terror, war on terror afghanistan, war on terror in pakistan, war on terror military strategy, war on terror obama, war on terror obama af-pak, war on terror pakistan, war on terror taliban, whats the difference with al qaeda and taliban, zainab jeewanjee, Zainab jeewanjee politics | 7 Comments »
August 18, 2009
“Pakistan Objects to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan War” reads a New York Times article last month updating us on our foreign policy. The article forewarns of “fissures” in the U.S. Pakistan alliance at this critical moment when President Obama sends additional troops to the region. The article specifically outlines Pakistan’s insistence on maintaining forces along the Indian border when the United States expresses concern that the Afghan border is of greater priority. Pakistani officials, to some international dismay, contend that it is more constructive to maintain dialogue with some parts of the Taliban rather than going at the group in an all out military offensive. The piece continues to explain that, sources from the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI: Pakistan’s intelligence agency, their equivalent to our CIA) briefed Special Envoy Holbrooke this morning in their strong concerns of an U.S. “surge” which would “result in more civilian casualties, further alienate local populations. Thus more local resistance to foreign troops”. And while the article continues with how these concerns contrast starkly with U.S. fears that Pakistan is not focusing enough on the Taliban in the north, it is important to revisit the consequences of, and reassess our long-term strategy in Operation Enduring Freedom. Because more of the same may not be an apt solution given that the war is escalating in terms of U.S. costs (on various levels), the region is deteriorating, and prominent experts now claim the effort is doomed to be “unwinnable”.
The fact is, this is the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and where there once was no Al Qaeda or Taliban in the sovereign state of Pakistan, now exists a terribly frightening border through which terrorists are fleeing and situating themselves in the north. Furthermore, it is important to remember that until recently, the Taliban was not considered a terrorist organization, although alarming they were not a military threat before 9/11. Al Qaeda was the main target in Afghanistan, and their presence in Pakistan was minimal, if at all. Since our invasion, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are increasingly difficult to differentiate, and rather than being obliterated, are moving in to Pakistan. And a once ideologically problematic group of Islamic extremists, the Taliban, are now dangerously aligning with far more treacherous terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda.
In a similar way, other regional militant groups are gaining ground as extremist groups evade NATO forces and subsequently weaken our anti-terrorist efforts. The Mumbai atrocities and embassy attacks in Afghanistan last year are testimony to the danger of militant groups advancing their efforts in an increasing climate of instability. This only legitimizes Pakistan’s skepticism of continuing an predominantly military means to combating terrorism. If limited surgical strikes, close intelligence sharing, and consistent provision of anti-terror training and supplies is agreed as effective amongst officials, the U.S. and Pakistan should focus on a “surge” on these fronts.
So when the news paints a clashing picture of interests between Pakistan and the United States, it is a simplistic one. Both states actually have an intense interest in securing the region against terrorists and while they might disagree on tactics, it is important that the Obama administration at least reassess the previous administration’s policies of simply implementing a military “surge”. Even if a surge in troops is potentially successful, working closely to expand on what has proven to be effective is a safer option. So a discerning look at this weeks supposed “fissure” between U.S. and Pakistani officials in discussing cooperation should prompt us to better understand Islamabad’s concerns and perhaps reassess our strategy .
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Zainab B. Jeewanjee
Zainab Jeewanjee 