Posts Tagged ‘afghanistan war on terror’
October 15, 2009
What happens when a majority of one country’s citizens opt for martial law but the democratically elected government in power including judicial, executive and legislative branches are against a military takeover? It’s quite the political conundrum because either side offers legitimate democratic authority, but they’re diametrically opposed. A rational answer is to let the democratically elected government fulfill it’s term and allow citizens to elect politicians to office who will support martial law in the next term. That might work in a fully functional democracy backed by institutions that can uphold legitimacy and granted the state is sufficiently secure. However, in light of decreasing security, severe economic downturns and age old skepticism of U.S. actions in Pakistan, ever so gradually the country shifts it’s gaze toward the military.
Decreasing Security :: To offer partial explanation in a nutshell: Since 2001, terrorists fleeing Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, spilled over into Pakistan at the nebulous northern border areas which are historically autonomous from federal regulation. The fact that Pakistan already housed one of the worlds largest refugee populations allowed this spillover a massive and destitute demographic from which to exploit support. As a result, we now see unprecedented terrorism in Pakistan where Al Qaeda and the Taliban had no significant presence prior to 9/11.
Skepticism of U.S.’s Role in Pakistan :: Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, bilateral realations with the United States have been defined by cooperation wherein Pakistan served as a proxy for U.S. Containment throughout the Cold War (i.e. security pacts like SEATO, CENTCOM, then aiding our Afghan led defense against Soviet incursions in the 1980’s). In exchange, Pakistan’s military with U.S. support, bolstered itself as the strongest, most efficient and stable institution in Pakistan. Some argue civilian governments and democratic institutions were thus never given an opportunity to compete with such a well funded, strongly backed military. And therein we find multifaceted dimensions that help explain the controversy over current U.S. support of Pakistan. Former Pakistan to U.S. ambassador Maleeha Lodhi describes the Kerry Lugar bill:
“the offending part of the legislation sets up the country as hired help and puts the military in the dock, presumed guilty on many counts and having to prove its innocence to Washington”
Pakistan is “hired help”, that’s the crux of skepticism on the Kerry-Lugar bill. Concern is rooted in a long history of cooperation with the United States that some argue created a behemoth military institution costing them a fair chance at democracy. In attempt to address that very concern, the Kerry Lugar bill mentions no military aid in exchange for cooperation on the War on Terror, unlike previous assistance packages from the Cold War. Ironically, bleak affairs in Pakistan now which are partially a result of pervious cooperation, particularly during the Soviet Afhgan war, prompt arguments that the military is exactly what needs support right now. Thus, the Lugar Bill receives not only skepticism from Pakistan’s strongest institution, but increasingly the public.
Although Secretary Clinton and Senators Kerry and Lugar have made no indication of altering the bill, to avoid future skepticism and potential resentment of U.S. involvement in Pakistan it could be wise to make changes so as to not sideline the military at this critical period in our War on Terror. Unlike previous Republican presidencies, the Obama administration is committed to dealing with civilian governments in Pakistan. It’s a noble idea and even though i don’t suspect that as the military gains legitimacy the civilian government will collapse soon, we should think twice before riling such concern over a bill that has just a 5 year life span. Central and South Asia are critical regions for our interests and we may need to engage strategically positioned Pakistan in more years to come. So a backlash by the most powerful institution in that country is something we should anticipate, and work actively against.
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October 9, 2009
After months of consideration on how to deal with our escalating engagement in the AF-Pak region, Obama’s administration has decided:
“the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a political or military movement”
An article in the Washington Post today cites the administrations re-vamped goal of mitigating a Taliban capacity to interfere in the establishment of a stable Afghan government while assuring us that Al Qaeda is the primary threat, and our strategy will focus squarely on eradicating them.
It seemed news on Pakistan in the past year revolved around Islamabad not doing enough to eradicate the Taliban; equating the group to Al Qaeda in terms of importance in the War on Terror. But today marks a clear departure from such criticism. Distinguishing Al Qaeda from the Taliban is a huge step forward for the United States. Because connecting our goals to eliminate both immediate security threats and major elements of Afghan society that are unpalatable to our values, has proven counter productive. Having lived in Pakistan to experience the ill effects of hyper conservative religious factions, I know we mean well in trying to uproot extremism, but it just hasn’t worked in tandem with our military offensive. And I’ve mentioned the importance of a distinction between these groups previously:
The Taliban is historically distinct from militant groups like Al Qaeda. Unlike the Taliban, Al Qaeda is directly responsible for 9/11. Simply put, the Taliban was an ideologically fundamental group, while Al Qaeda is a militant, terrorist group. Both are dangerous as such, but the Taliban has national interests in controlling Afghanistan under strict ideological rules while Al Qaeda is a militant organization with international ambitions.
It’s not a novel contention, but only just being reflected in policy, and I think it has potential for success. As an ideological force, the Taliban foster an ultra conservative brand of Islam, but are not necessarily a threat to our security interests. Plus, if General McChrystal’s goal is defined as establishing a sustainable, democratic Afghan government, in order for it to be considered legitimate, it must be rooted in Afghan values and according to Afghan preferences. Such preferences might seem backward, or entirely unpleasant to us, but so long as our interests are being protected, impressing our brand of democratic values should take a back seat for the time being. I think the Obama administration has taken a wise step in revamping the Af-Pak strategy and hope it yields lasting success.
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Posted in Current Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, International Relations, U.S. Politics, US Foreign Polciy | Tagged af-pak strategy, af-pak war, af-pak war on terror, Afghanistan, Afghanistan Pakistan, afghanistan pakistan politics, afghanistan taliban, afghanistan taliban politics, afghanistan war on terror, afpak, afpak war, Al Qaeda, al qaeda in pakistan, Al Qaeda Pakistan, al qaeda tailban, al qaeda taliban difference, al qaeda terrorism, al qaeda war on terror, alqaeda afghanistan, difference between al qaeda and talian, difference between al qaeda taliban, fighting al qaeda, fighting taliban, fighting the taliban in afghanistan, foreign policy to pakistan, general mcchrystal afghanistan, general mcchrystal afghanistan pakistan strategy, general mcchrystal military strategy, general mcchrystal obama strategy, general mcchrystal obama war on terror, general mcchrystal pakistan, general mcchrystal war on terror, International Affairs, International Affairs Pakistan, international politics, international politics in pakistan, international relations pakistan, mcchrystal af-pak, mcchrystal afghanistan, mcchrystal obama, mcchrystal on pakistan, mcchrystal pakistan, mcchrystal war on terror, obama afghanistan war on terror, obama led war on terror in afghanistan, obama troop surge, obama troops in afghanistan, obama us war on terror, obama war on terror, obama war on terror in afghanistan, obama war on terror in pakistan, obama war on terror pakistan, pakistan affairs., pakistan foreign policy, pakistan international relations, pakistan obama war on terror, pakistan political affairs, pakistan politics, pakistan taliban, pakistani, pakistani foreign policy, pakistani politics, pakistani taliban, pakistans foreign policy, political affairs of pakistan, politics in pakistan, politics of pakistan, politics pakistan, taliban afghanistan, taliban al qaeda, taliban eliminated, taliban in afghanistan, taliban in afghanistan and pakistan, taliban in pakistan, taliban in the war on terror, taliban pakistan, the difference between al qaeda and the taliban, US foreign policy to pakistan, us led war on terror afghanistan, us led war on terror pakistan, us troops in afghanistan, us troops war on terror, us war on terror taliban, war on terror, war on terror afghanistan, war on terror in pakistan, war on terror military strategy, war on terror obama, war on terror obama af-pak, war on terror pakistan, war on terror taliban, whats the difference with al qaeda and taliban, zainab jeewanjee, Zainab jeewanjee politics | 7 Comments »
August 18, 2009
“Pakistan Objects to U.S. Plan for Afghanistan War” reads a New York Times article last month updating us on our foreign policy. The article forewarns of “fissures” in the U.S. Pakistan alliance at this critical moment when President Obama sends additional troops to the region. The article specifically outlines Pakistan’s insistence on maintaining forces along the Indian border when the United States expresses concern that the Afghan border is of greater priority. Pakistani officials, to some international dismay, contend that it is more constructive to maintain dialogue with some parts of the Taliban rather than going at the group in an all out military offensive. The piece continues to explain that, sources from the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI: Pakistan’s intelligence agency, their equivalent to our CIA) briefed Special Envoy Holbrooke this morning in their strong concerns of an U.S. “surge” which would “result in more civilian casualties, further alienate local populations. Thus more local resistance to foreign troops”. And while the article continues with how these concerns contrast starkly with U.S. fears that Pakistan is not focusing enough on the Taliban in the north, it is important to revisit the consequences of, and reassess our long-term strategy in Operation Enduring Freedom. Because more of the same may not be an apt solution given that the war is escalating in terms of U.S. costs (on various levels), the region is deteriorating, and prominent experts now claim the effort is doomed to be “unwinnable”.
The fact is, this is the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Afghanistan and where there once was no Al Qaeda or Taliban in the sovereign state of Pakistan, now exists a terribly frightening border through which terrorists are fleeing and situating themselves in the north. Furthermore, it is important to remember that until recently, the Taliban was not considered a terrorist organization, although alarming they were not a military threat before 9/11. Al Qaeda was the main target in Afghanistan, and their presence in Pakistan was minimal, if at all. Since our invasion, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are increasingly difficult to differentiate, and rather than being obliterated, are moving in to Pakistan. And a once ideologically problematic group of Islamic extremists, the Taliban, are now dangerously aligning with far more treacherous terrorist outfits like Al Qaeda.
In a similar way, other regional militant groups are gaining ground as extremist groups evade NATO forces and subsequently weaken our anti-terrorist efforts. The Mumbai atrocities and embassy attacks in Afghanistan last year are testimony to the danger of militant groups advancing their efforts in an increasing climate of instability. This only legitimizes Pakistan’s skepticism of continuing an predominantly military means to combating terrorism. If limited surgical strikes, close intelligence sharing, and consistent provision of anti-terror training and supplies is agreed as effective amongst officials, the U.S. and Pakistan should focus on a “surge” on these fronts.
So when the news paints a clashing picture of interests between Pakistan and the United States, it is a simplistic one. Both states actually have an intense interest in securing the region against terrorists and while they might disagree on tactics, it is important that the Obama administration at least reassess the previous administration’s policies of simply implementing a military “surge”. Even if a surge in troops is potentially successful, working closely to expand on what has proven to be effective is a safer option. So a discerning look at this weeks supposed “fissure” between U.S. and Pakistani officials in discussing cooperation should prompt us to better understand Islamabad’s concerns and perhaps reassess our strategy .
Posted in International Affairs, International Relations, U.S. Politics | Tagged Afghan border, Afghanistan, Afghanistan Pakistan, Afghanistan war, afghanistan war on terror, Al Qaeda Pakistan, CIA, defining the US surge for pakistan, defining us surge, defining us surge for pakistan, instability pakistan, ISI, NATO and pakistan, nato pakistan, new york times, Pakistan, pakistan al qaeda, Pakistan and NATO, pakistan US alliance, Pakistan US cooperation, Pakistan US relations, Pakistan war on terror, Pakistan. US foreign policy, Pakistani intelligence, Surge, surgical strikes pakistan, Taliban, terrorism pakistan, U.S. Surge, uprooting terrorism in pakistan, uprooting terrorism pakistan, US efforts in afghanistan, US efforts in pakistan, US foreign policy, US foreign policy to pakistan, US pakistan alliance, US pakistan cooperation, US Pakistan relations, war on terror, war on terror pakistan, zainab jeewanjee, zainab jeewanjee Pakistan, Zainab jeewanjee politics | Leave a Comment »
Zainab B. Jeewanjee
Zainab Jeewanjee 