Posts Tagged ‘India Pakistan’

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The Cleanup

July 29, 2010
Zainab Jeewanjee with Ambassador Hussain Haqqani

Zainab Jeewanjee with Ambassador Hussain Haqqani

“30 years of this whole business that started with the jihad against the Soviet Union is what we are trying to deal with the aftermath of. Its 30 years of these groups, supporting them, funding them, the opening of radical madrassahs in various parts of the country. Now I think we’ve done a decent job in the last two years of beginning the cleanup”

Pakistan is serious about cleaning up terrorism, but the mess runs deep. And If you want to share in an insightful discussion on the Wikileaks reports, I recommend watching Charlie Rose from last night. Because Pakistan pulled out the big guns in responding to the reports that suggested their Interservices Intelligence Agency is “aiding” the enemies in Afghanistan. Ambassador Hussain Haqqani was Rose’s guest and spoke directly to American anxieties that Pakistan is not entirely interested in ousting terrorists from the region. Specifically responding to the question of ISI links to the Taliban, Haqqani said:

It goes back to the soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The CIA and ISI both worked with the Mujahedeen who morphed into Taliban. But now the Pakistani military and ISI are conducting successful military operations in SWAT and South Waziristan.

He elaborated:

We’ve Taken out extremists and 74 ISI personnel have been killed in the past two years. With as many as 233 injured. That alone should be sufficient to convince people that was then and now is now and Pakistan is standing firmly on the side of those who want to eliminate the Taliban and extremists”

The statistics were particularly hard hitting. They brought a human element to our somewhat sterilized discussion about Pakistan here in the states. Being geographically removed, and with a vastly distinct culture, we are mostly informed of how the government in Islamabad deals with our administration in D.C., resorting to diplomatic sound bites and news for our information. But Haqqanis statistics provoke us to realize that just as we have struggled in Afghanistan, Pakistan too has sacrificed greatly as an ally in our war and continues to be deeply invested in combating terror.

Haqqani reminds us that the Wikileaks story is just that; a whistleblower. Without subtracting from the value of revealing what governments might otherwise keep classified, the Ambassador offered facts that quell sensationalized reception of the reports.

Rose asked weighty questions in trademark straightforwardness allowing us a chance to get answers to that the Wikileaks story leaves us lingering with. For instance, “what keeps Pakistan from doing more”; a question even those with ample knowledge and understanding of history and ground realities who can put the Wikileaks story into context sometimes wonder. Rose speculated it was a concern with India, and a fear of U.S. withdrawal. The Ambassador responded:

“There is a concern that India is not yet reconciled to our nationhood and statehood. Those are concerns reflected in public opinion and government has to deal with view that the US has not been a consistent friend of Pakistan and if we do too much at the behest of US they could leave us in the lurch and walk away again. The Biggest concern is the US can actually leave projects incomplete it has happened in the past US assistance and economic aid suspended arbitrarily and at short notice. Things have been left incomplete. They have had a very difficult relationship in the past 6 decades. We are trying tot address the totality of these issues”

It is no secret that India Pakistan relations are a primary driver of action in South Asian politics so the real nugget in the Ambassador’s above response is the talk of Pakistani Public opinion.

One of the first rules we learn in politics is that perceptions matter and what our pundits and political speechwriters have left out of the conversation is how Pakistani opinions factor into Islamabad’s policymaking.

The Obama administration made clear by way of allocating funding in the Kerry Lugar bill that America would no longer support military regimes at the expense of democracy in Pakistan, yet we still tend to leave consideration of Pakistani public opinion out of our own expectations. Apprehensions of U.S. foreign policy are increasingly common as Pakistan deteriorated economically, politically in overall security post 9/11.

Ambassador Haqqani did an eloquent job of explaining this tremendous sensitivity with which Islamabad must balance its interest in continuing bilateral cooperation with D.C. while alleviating a rampant fear amongst Pakistani citizens that the United States might not be trustworthy, or as the Ambassador put it “ungrateful” for all their country does.

And although Ambassador Haqqani concluded on a positive note , citing increased military cooperation in fighting terrorism and tripartite agreements on trade, he gave viewers a clear view of the “totality” and complexity of issues from the Pakistan side.

To tally Islamabad’s task list thus far: in addition to 30 years of deep cleaning, speedy recovery from loss of life, toil, treasure and time, one must add mending 60 years of mistrust with the worlds superpower to Pakistan’s list of things everyone wants done yesterday.

So let’s think twice, maybe even thrice before sponging the Wikileaks reports without an understanding of context and implicating Pakistan for not doing enough.  Prime Minister Cameron, that’ means you.

ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED @ the Foreign Policy Association

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India & Pakistan – Going At it Again

June 19, 2010
Pakistan Warms up for the Asia Cup India Match - June 2010

Pakistan Warms up for the Asia Cup India Match - June 2010

Well, it’s that time again. An India vs. Pakistan ODI match will be underway in a few moments. And there’s nothing like India-Pakistan cricket. For better or worse, it’s THE epic rivalry; it get’s catty, intense, fans are insanely polarized. It’s basically crickets equivalent to the NHL’s Crosby / Ovechkin rivalry. For my non-sports readers, it’s akin to team Aniston vs team Angelina. (for the record: I’m team Ovechkin and Angelina respectively)

But whether you’re a Pakistan or India fan, both teams are somewhat evenly matched at this time with Pakistan having more depth and raw talent, and India with firm composure, more consistent experience and better record in recent history. So it’s likely going to be a nail biter, winding down to the final over to determine a winner.

So, what’s it going to take for the men in green? Here’s what’s swimming around my head before the game:

Afridi: Stay the same. Awesome performance in the last game as skipper. In typical Afridi character he lived up to the “boom boom” title and strong character we expect from him. With 110 off of 75 it was his natural game catapulted to great heights with leadership and consistency. Good news is he has a tendency to excel against India. Let’s hope that form is maintained.

Salman Butt: Hold your wicket yo. He usually does, but it’s not always certain, yet crucial that he does so today. The Indian bowling attack looks mediocre, but don’t underestimate their pace bowling. Zaheer Khan is in the attack and Nehra could do harm too.

Abdur Razzaq: My favorite All rounder must be the Danger Man today. What does that mean? It means if we need it, you make 14 runs an over. No questions asked. Oh, and when we need those key maiden overs in the last hour of their lineup, keep up the bowling defense.

Kamran Akmal: Please no butterfingers. This is a world class game and an epic rivalry, no room for drop catches. Also, be quicker on the stumpings. Be a solid bat; a clutch hitter picking up the run rate consistently as a lower order batsman and even more so if you’re pushed up the order.

Mohammad Aamer: Come in strong and shut down Sehwag. Perhaps cut him some slack early on, get him into a slogging mindset then throw on pressure with an ultra slow ball. Sehwag’s bat is so fast that this is bound to be confusing to his game.

Shahzaib Hasan: Damn rookie stop playing like it’s a test match.

Shoaib Akhtar: Watch the extras, nuff said. If The Rawalpindi express does this, there’s no stopping him.

Shoaib Malik: Be at the top of your game, back form a honeymoon we need to see classic Malik in your best form. Picking off Harbhajan smashing off a couple sixes, fielding like a beast, and with accurate off spin.

Umar Akmal: Run with raw talent. You’ve got the youth, energy and can hold your wicket with a solid strike rate. Pick up the occasional boundary and stay consistent.

Prediction :::: the game changer will be either Shoaib  Malik or Shoab Akhtar. They’re comback kids and can steal matches for Pakistan. They’ve done it in classic form in the past, and i want to see them do it again tonight.

Let the games begin !

🙂

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South Asian Smart Power – Aman ki Asha

February 26, 2010
Futility of Military/Economically Motivated relations Minus Democratic Input

Futility of Military Motivated relations Minus Democratic Input

While working in D.C. some years back almost every Congress person, Think Tank and academic I came across was certain on one thing on nuclear proliferation: if an atomic bomb ever goes off again, it’s going to happen in South Asia. It was a dismal but resounding notion that I have even heard expressed amongst South Asians. Profound mistrust, three wars, land disputes, all spurred by a gory colonial partition 60 odd years ago has left Pakistan and India scarred in a way that makes cynics of even the best of us.

A realist might tell you that nuclear armed neighbors by way of deterrence have allowed India and Pakistan to refrain from war since testing their atom bombs, but even they would conclude war is inevitable. Liberals would make a case for enhanced trade to gradually spur economic interdependence to help avoid conflict, which is perhaps the most palatable idea, but statistics show that deepening trade between India and Pakistan has not yet improved relations:

“trade between India and Pakistan was at its highest ever in the year following Kargil. 

Even the Mumbai attacks have not significantly dented India-Pakistan trade relations. Pakistan trades with 100’s of countries, India being the 9th largest trading partner”

So if deepening trade and deterrence haven’t yielded what confidently could be considered lasting peace, what will it take? I’m of the opinion that realist and liberalist policies must be accompanied by ground level, macro scale diplomacy.  Because while deterrence satisfies the all mighty military institutions, and trade satisfies highly influential business elites there’s little attention given to the masses; and by masses I mean billions of South Asians who have yet to even fathom peace as a possibility.

Call it ground level diplomacy, soft power or good ol’ winning hearts and minds: it’s  the missing ingredient in bilateral relations. Resident Indian’s and Pakistani’s have a perceived animosity for one another that verges on the irrational. Catapulting cricket matches between both countries as akin to war, hate crimes against Muslims in India to cross border terrorism is absurd for states divided by man made, post colonial borders.

So the problem is not one of trade, or military might: it’s epistemic. Both countries must engage one another from the ground up. Shashi Tharoor, the decorated Indian Parliamentarian described the effectiveness of Indian soft power best at a TED conference last year:

“India’s soft power, its true of music, dance of arts, yoga, aryuveda, even cuisine. With these examples come the sense that in todays world its not the side of the bigger army that wins, it’s the one that tells a better story. And india is the land of a better story. Stereotypes are changing.  Today people in Silicon valley people talk of IIT’s with same reverence of MIT”

Why not apply that soft power in Pakistan? And vice versa. I laud the Aman ki Asha initiative for doing exactly this. Launched by Pakistani media conglomerate Geo T.V. and on the Indian side, the Times of India, both companies have taken up the task of engaging both countries using soft power. As media houses, through television, print and web placements, they engage masses directly, finally sidestepping politically or economically motivated discourse both countries are used to. THeir mission statement reads:

Public opinion is far too potent a force to be left in the hands of narrow vested interests. The people of today must find its voice and force the rulers to listen. The awaam must write its own placards and fashion its own slogans. The leaders must learn to be led and not blindly followed. Skepticism about the given is often the genesis of faith. This skepticism has been brewing. It can be unleashed to forge a new social compact between the people of this region. A social compact based on a simple yet powerful impulse – Aman ki Asha. A desire for peace.

Aman ki Asha taps the widespread but underrepresented sentiments of commonality shared by South Asians. By engaging the masses directly with soft power it’s is a brilliant first step at mitigating the most potent problem in bilateral relations: mistrust. And what is most brilliant about the initiative is that could have teeth. Unlike countless other proposals for peace, Aman ki Asha uses mass media to speak to masses directly with a specifically outlined agenda:

“Issues of trade and commerce, of investments, of financial infrastructure, of cultural exchanges, of religious and medical tourism, of free movement of ideas, of visa regimes, of sporting ties, of connectivity, of reviving existing routes, of market access, of separated families, of the plight of prisoners, will be part of our initial agenda. Through debates, discussions and the telling of stories we will find commonalities and space, for compromise and adjustment, on matters that have bedevilled relations for over 60 years”

It sounds promising, because although I do not anticipate this dissemination of smart power to yield results immediately, if it’s done consistently it might have a capacity to democratize the push for peace. It ought not to be the military, or economic institutions setting the agenda, rather, policies should reflect the will of the people. Aman ki Asha is a hugely cooperative step in bilateral ties. More peaceful relations in South Asia can begin by reminding the masses of what my Pakistani born and raised mother said when she came back from a trip to India in 2005 they (Indians) eat the same food, sound the same, act and even look the same as us”. With such strong commonality felt amongst everyday people, one questions the legitimacy of policymaking that has historically divided, rather than united South Asians. And if that sentiment disseminates, albeit gradually, there’s much to hope for in the future.

ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED @

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Musharraf’s Solution – An Af-Pak Political Surge

December 7, 2009

As President Obama announced a troop surge in the Af-Pak war, former leader of Pakistan General Musharraff weighed in with specifics a solution would require.

In the Wall Street Journal this week, he explainedquitting is not an option”, and “time limits” should not drive our exit strategy. Rather, in tandem with additional troops, a “political” surge is key. With firsthand military and political experience in the Af-Pak region and War on Terror, Musharraf gives us substance with which to understand the situation. He explains that when the United States “liberated Afghanistan from the tyranny of Al Qaeda and Taliban, they had unequivocal support of the majority of Afghans.” What we didn’t do though, is establish a “truly representative national government” giving proportional representation to Pashtun’s who are the ethnic majority. He says:

The political instability and ethnic imbalance in Afghanistan after 9/11 marginalized the majority Pashtuns and pushed them into the Taliban fold, even though they were not ideological supporters of the Taliban.

As a result, despite Pakistani efforts during Musharraf’s tenure where “600 Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders, some of them of very high value” were captured in tandem with the establishment of “1000 border check posts”, the Afghan government never gained legitimacy, and ultimately, sufficient authority. He further attributes insufficient NATO forces and the distraction of invading Iraq as leading causes to the Taliban’s capacity to gain ground, and reassert its center of gravity toward northern Pakistan.

With a grand strategy to destabilize the whole region, the Taliban and al Qaeda established links with extremists in Pakistani society on the one hand and with Muslim fundamentalists in India on the other.

It’s a complex situation, but Musharraff’s recommendations are rooted in a wealth of experience and offer details on a practical solution.

ORIGINALLY PIBLISHED @

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Fareed Zakaria Interviews Musharraff

November 9, 2009

Pervez Musharraf was on Fareed Zakaria GPS this morning discussing the Af-Pak situation in two segments. The second segment focused on Pakistan where Zakaria prefaced Q&A by reminding viewers that General Musharraf is an “authentic representation of Pakistan’s military” and that his comments will reveal that the situation in Afghanistan is rooted in a 60 year geopolitical rivalry that we just walked in to, and its between between India and Pakistan“. Sounded like grand stuff.

And Zakaria jumped right in. He began with questions on whether the Pakistan military is as committed to eliminating terrorists in the north who launch cross border attacks as they are to obliterating terrorists in the South who are responsible for domestic assaults. He said the military “never seems to get around to attacking North Waziristan who attacks India or Afghanistan because they were supported in the past”. Musharraff made clear that during his tenure, he insisted on drone technology needed to obliterate terrorists from both regions, especially given Baitullah Mehsud who assassinated Bhutto and that terrorists were never supported by the military or any government policy. He mentioned that ISI “ingress” in terrorist groups is standard procedure practiced by all Intelligence operations, clarifying that “ingress” is not be equated to “support”, rather it’s standard maintenance of contacts with such groups for the states advantage.

When questioned about the widespread notion that Al Qaeda leader Mullah Umar is in Pakistan, Musharraf said it’s “200% wrong” explaining Umar would have no interest in leaving a safe haven in the northern areas where Taliban has de-facto control for Quetta where US and Pakistani intelligence/ military roam rampant. It was a reasonable response and Zakaria’s questions sounded increasingly implicative.

Zakaria probed the notion saying that the “Afghanistan government and intelligence say he’s in Pakistan” to which Musharraff firmly explained “don’t talk about the Afghan government and intelligence. By design, they mislead the world, they talk against Pakistan because they are entirely under the influence of Indian intelligence”.

Wow, he just said it. It’s often documented in Pakistani media that Indian intelligence is widely responsible for insurgencies in northern areas of Pakistan and the province of Balochistan by way of material support, but rarely is that view expressed in mainstream U.S. media. Former Foreign Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada recently explained to me that warming of relations between Delhi and Kabul come at a direct expense of Pakistan because of such subversive, Indian led dealings with Afghanistan. Similarly, Musharraf explained he has provided “documented evidence” of this activity in the past.

From the first question on Pakistan’s commitment to uprooting cross border terrorism, to the question on Mullah Umar, Zakaria elicited Musharraf into discussion of a supposed “geopolitical rivalry” between India and Pakistan wherein Afghanistan is used as a “client state” by either nation as a buffer against, if not to subvert one another. And although I can’t say that is entirely untrue, Zakaria approached today’s interview with this preconceived notion, and overstepped neutrality by implicating Pakistan in the process.

ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED @

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On The Brink of Sanity : India v Pakistan Cricket

September 27, 2009

CRICKET-INDIA-PAKISTAN-FANS

Excited about Pakistan’s victory in todays ODI vs. India at the ICC Champions Trophy, i looked for YouTube highlights of previous India Pakistan matches hoping to relive thrilling performances of batsmen trembling at Akram/Younis yorkers or some record breaking Tendulkar/Sehwag innings. But I was unable to find a consolidated reel of South Asian highlights as such. It seems all content pertaining to Indian and Pakistani Cricket are elaborately produced showcases of either country triumphing over the other, or amusing clips revealing serious sledging between both teams over the years. And that’s understandable, it’s a competitive sport and fans create videos for the teams they support.

But something is changing. I don’t think fans are looking at these videos the same way as years past. Sambit Bal wrote a nice precursor to today’s match describing the epic India Pakistan rivalry as something far more profound than just another sporting competition. He says cricket in South Asia “has always been close to the national identity”. Quite astutely, he describes how it’s then used: “sometimes as a salve, sometimes a weapon; it has enabled bonding and it has divide; at times it has been a bridge, at others a vehicle for ugly chauvinism; and governments have used it as both a handshake as well as a show of fists”. And therein lies the dilemma.

India Pakistan matches are tremendously exciting, wrought with raw enthusiasm and incredible anticipation, but wind up raising stakes far higher than are normal or necessary. Bal says cricket is close to South Asian “national identity”, and in conversations I’ve heard matches described as akin to “war” or “religion”. That’s just going too far.

To inextricably tie these matches to one’s identity or religious affiliation let alone actual combat is absurd, but fortunately, a phenomenon that’s shrinking. Less and less are India Pakistan matches carrying the same weight for masses and even players. Bal explains that because matches between the countries have increased since 2004, an

“overkill took away the anticipation and intensity. But from a larger perspective, it also took away the heat and emotional charge, and that was not a bad thing at all. Since they were always playing, wins and losses no longer felt like life and death. It felt somewhat dull, but it also felt sane.”

Ahhhh, it felt sane. Now that’s a great way to put it. Cricket shouldn’t be a tool or driving force of nationality, politics let alone international relations. That’s a recipe for perpetual division, which is the last thing South Asia, or the world for that matter needs right now. So even if India Pakistan matches are seeing diminished anticipation, at least it shifts our focus toward the game itself rather than political, social and religious issues which ought to be unrelated. Because a heightened concentration on the game of cricket can finally allow us to debate what’s truly interesting. Like how Pakistan is the only team capable of winning a match in the last ten over’s by scoring 100+ runs while India is the only team who can do that in the first ten 😉

ALTERNATE PUBLICATION @

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Peace Pipeline Causes Concern for DC

September 15, 2009

Iran-Pakistan-India Natural Gas pipeline

The anticipated Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI/”Peace Pipeline”) pipeline may end up running only through Iran/Pakistan as India backed out from the project last week says Muhammad Abbasi, Pakistani Ambassador to Iran. Delhi’s withdrawal comes simultaneously as the US pressures Islamabad to disengage from the multibillion dollar project set for completion in 2013. This adds to the list of obstacles IPI faced since it was conceptualized in the 1990’s. From international pressures, prolonged funding negotiations, to domestic insecurities and reservations, the pipeline has yet to begin construction. However, Pakistan stresses urgency in moving forward with construction in the face of alarming energy shortages :

Only 60% of households have electricity and 18% access to pipeline gas for heating. Energy demand is expected to increase 250% over the next 20 years. To meet expected demand, electrical generating capacity must grow by 50% from 20.4 gigawatts to 30.6 gigawatts by 2010

As a result, Islamabad works diligently to address the issue. President Zardari is dealing closely with the Chinese on hydel projects in underdeveloped areas of the north and this May, the 7.5 billion dollar deal allowing Iranian oil supplies to Pakistan was officially signed. It initially permits 30 million cubic meters of gas per day and later to 60 million whichgreatly begins to alleviate the energy crisis:

Pakistan’s domestic gas production is falling and import dependence growing tremendously. By connecting itself with the world’s 2nd largest gas reserve, Pakistan guarantees a reliable supply for decades. If the pipeline were to be extended to India it could also be an instrument for stability in often tense Pakistan-India relations. Under any scenario of pipeline expansion which makes Pakistan a transit state, Islamabad stands to gain from transit fees hundreds of millions of dollars every year.

Given such potential, it’s not surprising Pakistan is intent on moving forward with IPI regardless of pressure from D.C. Despite Special Envoy Holbrooke’s diplomatic suggestions that the United States might “link funds committed by the Democratic Friends of Pakistan” to their cooperation with Iran on IPI, foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi maintained Pakistan’s urgency:

“The  gas pipeline construction agreement with Iran and Pakistan will by no means go under the U.S. pressures,”

But some experts insist that without American support to release funding and loan guarantees, financing of IPI will make the 2013 deadline unfeasible. This poses problems for Pakistan, and on the American front, there are differing concerns. Hoping to maintain US authority and secure interests in the region, President Obama shifts starkly from the previous administration using more engagement and soft power with Iran. So American moves to work with the international community in economically choking Iran and ultimately eliciting behavior from Tehran are diminished as Iranian influence increases through international projects such as IPI. Hardline Bush Administration and more diplomatic Obama led policies are interesting yielding similar ends as Iran continues to expand trade and relations with the international community. This flouts hard, soft, all stances the United States takes in attempting to contain Tehran.

For instance, a vastly constructed pipeline running over 2,775 kilometers (1,725 miles)from the Persian Gulf in Iran, through Baluchistan to a port in Karachi and then north to New Delhi creates “an unbreakable long term political and economic dependence” of billions of people from Pakistan, to India and potentially extending to China.

The prospect of the entire subcontinent being “dependent” on Iran actually sounds alarming, but if we look at certain realities it’s perhaps far fetched. Firstly, any semblance of an actual dependence is most likely only applied to Pakistan given their current energy crisis, the cost effectiveness and efficiency of natural gas as opposed to developing LNG sources: India on the other hand has “two LNG terminals and will complete a third terminal by this year. Two additional terminals have also been proposed, and several companies are examining viability of constructing additional LNG import sites”. So Delih is far less likely to be entirely reliant on Tehran for natural gas because developments in LNG and civilian nuclear projects. Plus, India’s long, strong alliance with Russia allows for a convenient energy supplier to the north if need be. In fact, for Moscow IPI is an opportunity to quell thoughts that Tehran will compete in supplying natural gas to EU markets. Russia’s deputy energy minister explains:

“It is therefore in Russia’s interest to derail the Nabucco project by diverting Iran’s gas away from Europe and locking it to the Asian market. We are ready to join the project as soon as we receive an offer”

Thus a point of contention for Moscow and Washington. DC’s fears are further exacerbated by a potential of IPI eventually ensuring energy supplies to long standing Pakistani ally, China with shipments along the Karakoram Highway through future pipelines . The argument made is that hopes of modifying Iranian behavior with economic pressures plus our mutual hedging with China suffers if IPI is constructed. Again, this relies on the assumption that billions of Indians and Chinese become “dependent” on Iranian gas supplies, which I find unlikely. Pakistan if anyone, is likely to become heavily reliant on those supplies in the next couple decades should IPI be executed as planned. Thus suggested solutions point to alternative pipelines that bypass Iran:

“A rival gas-pipeline project — the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) carrying gas from Daulatabad in Turkmenistan via Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan to Multan in central Pakistan is one such alternative”

But this concept is contingent to a stable Afghanistan, which most experts indicate is not in the near future. Without stabilizing Afghanistan and given chilly relations with India, TAPI is not likely to move forward without overcoming numerous diplomatic and security obstacles.  And Pakistan’s energy crisis doesn’t afford Islamabad time to wait for the international community to stabilize Afghanistan or warming relations with India.

Critics of IPI also insist it is conducive to US interests for Pakistan to develop LNG supplies rather than natural gas. This probably entails cooperation with Europe and the United States as opposed to Iran, which is an unviable suggestion. Firstly, LNG development is more expensive than natural gas supplies through a pipeline.  Plus, it’s more probable that Pakistan receive lower cost, soft term loans in dealing with Iran as opposed to the EU or US.  IPI also presents a possibility of improved trade opening import markets for Pakistan where Iranians can purchase food items. Pakistan has a strong agricultural base and produces wheat, sugar and rice that can be exported efficiently to its neighbors. So for Pakistan, IPI is a viable solution to the energy crisis in addition to creating future revenue generation.

Finally, US critics warn that the security situation in Afghanistan-Pakistan at the moment bodes badly for practicable pipeline construction:

Should the worst happen and a Taliban style regime take over Pakistan, the economies of the world’s most radical Shiite state and that of what could be the world’s most radical Sunni state would be connected to each other for decades to come like conjoined twins.

This is an outrageous misgiving. Al Qaeda and the Taliban spilled over into Pakistan since our War on Terror began in 2001, meaning the Taliban are nowhere near rampant in number or have many sympathizers amongst the mostly moderate population. The Pakistani army made strides in efficiently securing the Swat valley and continue to make progress in eradicating militants. Assuming the entire Pakistani military and heads of state can not obliterate 20-40K (at maximum) Taliban is unreasonable. Many experts have indicated, it’s not that it can’t be done, it’s working to ensure the job gets done efficiently and to secure the long term which is taking time. I think the suspicion of Taliban influence in Pakistan is used perhaps to sensationalize the consequences of IPI construction.

Still, critics maintain that IPI is against our interests and hope lies in it never being constructed given diminutive chances of getting the needed 7.5 billion in funding and because of the volatile location of construction. IPI would run through the province of Baluchistan where resentment and instability with the federal government is historical, underprivileged masses prevail and prior instances of attacks on water pipelines ensued.  These facts might impede construction of IPI but it’s important to note that even the most critical voices against the pipeline maintain we not intervene in aiding any subversion of federal government projects in Baluchistan:

US open support for opposition groups who might be willing to undermine the project is unthinkable as any collaboration – overt or covert – would severely cripple our relations with Islamabad

Pakistan’s deep cooperation and commitment to fighting the War on Terror trump other priorities. Plus, in the long run, economic interdependence  at the cost of our diminishing influence is maybe preferred to a possibility that this region become increasingly rife with groups well armed and trained at subverting national governments. The Soviet Afghan War was our best teacher of that lesson.

Finally, critics argue how it’s against US interests for Iranian influence to expand in South Asia through IPI because it would add regional instability should Tehran become nuclear and support terrorism. However, this relies on the assumption that heads of state are engaging in bilateral trade with Pakistan on this project for an ultimate goal of international terrorism and that heads of state are irrationally going to create instability in a region that they are increasingly economically interdependent with.

Certainly, a successful natural gas pipeline that spurs economic growth for Iran and helps solve South Asia’s energy crisis might increase Tehran’s influence to some extent, but overall instability and supporting terrorism runs counter to basic arguments of liberal theories of capitalism. With increased trade and interdependence, might increased peace and less interest and instability ensue?

Thus in accepting the reality of what Fareed Zakaria calls, “The Rise of the Rest” wherein increasingly interdependent and economically stable states using minimum or zero US intervention are growing into regional powers President Obama is beckoned to reassess foreign policy. Iran won’t likely rival American hegemony through IPI, but increasingly such situations require we evolve policies to effectively deal with long standing allies like Pakistan who are inevitably drawn into relations that could diminish our influence.

ORIGINALLY POSTED @

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Arms Race in South Asia : To be Continued….

August 31, 2009

This summers meeting between Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani and Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh at the Non-Aligned Summit (NAM) resumed cooperative talks since they had stalled after the Mumbai atrocities. The summit marked a breakthrough in Indian-Pakistani relations when both sides decided to bracket issues of terrorism from future peace talks, by signing an agreement that identifies terrorism as the tantamount, mutual interest at this time. But the meeting has proven costly for Prime Minister Singh who some speculate, in attempt to leave behind a legacy of progressive cooperation with Pakistan, might have gone too far. Members of the opposition BJP party, and even some in his own Congress party say the NAM declaration does little else but soften India’s position in foreign policy to Pakistan.

Singh addressed criticism in Parliament during debate with a BJP member who accused him of “surrendering” and “walking into the Pakistani camp”. The prime minister countered that unless tensions and possible war are desired, such engagement is necessary and by in large, did not retract his statements. Although, he did try and recover some political base by later clarifying: “ talks between the two countries on broader issues like trade and travel cannot continue unless Pakistan pursues strong action against terror”. The clarification however, maintains his stance that peace talks can take place bracketing concerns on terrorism but would still allow leeway for trade and travel issues to be used as leverage later. Delinking peace talks thus leaves open the possibility of including Kashmir in future discussions with Pakistan, (although there is no specific mention of Kashmir in the agreement), and could mark a beginning of more progressive dialogue. Singh specifically cited Prime Minister Gilani’s providing an  additional dossier on the Mumbai atrocities at the NAM summit had convinced him of Pakistan’s commitment to uprooting terrorist groups given that:

“this is the first time that Pakistan has ever formally briefed us on the results of an investigation into a terrorist attack in India. It is also the first time that they have admitted that their nationals and a terrorist organization based in Pakistan carried out a ghastly terrorist act in India.”

Under current leadership it seems relations are moving with some positive direction, with emphasis on the word “some”. Because such instances for optimism  are not entirely rare in South Asian history. A recent article in Dawn reminds us that while positive dialogue takes place,

“India-Pakistan relations do not move in a straight line. They zigzag from crisis to crisis. In the interregnum the two countries either engage in negotiations or struggle to revive an interrupted dialogue”

That’s a very perceptive notion. The agreement at NAM is hopefully indicative of future cooperation, but history has shown us a reality that the arms race in South Asia tends to impede diplomatic progress. Ultimately, the message conveyed with development of arms, is immediate, tangible, and potentially hostile. On the other hand, diplomacy is gradual, inherently more subtle and less concrete.

So earlier this week on the anniversary celebrating India’s retaking of military posts in Kargil when Delhi symbolically launched its nuclear submarine, the INS Arihant (Destroyer of the Enemies) realpolitik dictates a clear message to Pakistan that is explained by their Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit:

‘continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India’ is ‘detrimental to regional peace and stability’.
The obvious concern in Pakistan then is whether this capability is a potential “platform to launch nuclear missiles”

Thus when either neighbor develops such armaments, basics of power politics teaches that the risk of not responding with deterrent armaments could be akin to state suicide. Whether or not one assumes conflict to be inevitable , an arms race is almost certain in situations like this. So, even though Pakistan is unlikely to announce nuclear submarine capability soon, in some capacity armaments of defense will be sought to counter India’s recent development. This will be considered necessary even though the Indian launch is directed at China’s rapid military modernization and not limited to a focus on Pakistan. Realpolitik will still drive Islamabad to invest in counter armaments despite the fact that Pakistan is heavily invested in the costly War on Terror, and more than ever in need of funding for social developments and aid for the largest refugee problem in the world.

International summits such as the Non Aligned Movement or even SAARC  meetings which yield progressive diplomacy then work secondary to an expensive, and expansive arms race which in turn, perpetuates a now notorious and mutual mistrust that plagues South Asia. So, Prime Minister Singh’s alleged “softening” with Pakistan might be conciliatory in a diplomatic way, but continued development of armaments eclipses that rhetoric. Progressive relations will ultimately require more tangible approaches that enhance a meaningful trust rather than perpetuate an arms race.

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India Pakistan: Hostility Grows Stale

August 27, 2009

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, better known as the founder of Pakistan when India was divided in 1947 is making headlines today with controversy surrounding ex-Indian Parliamentarian Jaswant Singh’s recent book: India – Partition – Independence. Immediately following the books release, Singh was expelled from his position in the Bhartiya Janata (BJP) party,  protests wherein the book was burned and a prompt ban on the work in Gujarat ensued. But why the uproar?

In a recent interview, Singh reveals the following views on Jinnah  that are now apparently too controversial in India, but receiving mostly praise across Pakistan:

  • Jinnah was an Indian nationalist
  • He joined the Indian Congress party before the Muslim League implying an original loyalty to a United India and eventual shift to non secularism as a result of Congress party politics later
  • Jinnah fought the British for an Independent India, in tandem with fighting “resolutely and relentlessly” for Muslim rights in India
  • Jinnah is admirable for being a self made man, having created a position in politics for himself without the luxury of prior wealth or status
  • Jinnah was not anti-Hindu
  • Jinnah failed insofar as he received a “moth eaten” piece of divided India in the form of Pakistan and left Muslims who stayed back in India without sufficient guidance
  • Gandhi himself referred to Jinnah as a great Indian, so there should be no controversy in recognizing him as such today
  • Muslims in India today are downtrodden, live in pain and are “robbed of the essence of psychological security”
  • Both Indian Muslims and Pakistani’s have paid a price for Partition since both would have been stronger under a united India

To those who have not grown up or spent much time in South Asia, it may be difficult to understand why such ideas can be controversial and strike such polar chords in the hearts and minds of people divided by a man made border only 60 years ago. But the division of India, into two states resulting in an independent Pakistan saw extreme violence, mass refugee migration and that carnage left a lasting scar on South Asian mindsets. Put in a most blunt form: India suffered the bitter taste of a fractured state that is rooted among the great civilizations in history.  And Pakistan suffered the bitter reality of as Singh put it, “a moth eaten”, post colonial state with perhaps an inevitably fractured and frail territory from inception. From the bizarre geopolitical landscape of Bangladesh not contingent to, yet officially part of Pakistan to the conflict over Kashmir at the very onset of partition, Singh makes a fair point in explaining partition caused profound suffering on both ends. The subsequent bitterness is manifest in perpetual hostility between both states in the form of conflicts, and in India, even on a communal level where according to Singh, Muslims are still downtrodden.

So praising Jinnah as a “great man” in India may be akin to condoning the very fracturing of India. In Pakistan, it’s lauded as an admission that their founder heroically created a homeland where Muslims would no longer be downtrodden. Singh’s work also might acknowledge that partition dealt an unfair hand to Pakistani’s, an idea that can come across as unpalatable on the Indian side. But relying on interviews from Jaswant Singh on the book so far, I think the controversy is a tired insinuation of hostility from the state. Banning the book on the grounds that:

“the text in it is misleading for the public and against interest of the state, and therefore, the book must be forfeited and prohibited”

only fuels a hostile polarization of India and Pakistan. Mind you, India and Pakistan as states are increasingly polarized, which in turn results in a division of peoples. Because my guess is that had government kept its hands out of censoring Singh’s book it might have spoken to the hearts and minds of South Asian’s disseminating novel ideas that are not divisive. Noam Chomsky once said that “states are violent institutions”, in South Asia, at the very least they are bitter, but people inherently are not. Singh’s work might have tapped into that sentiment and in the banning of it, states tighten their grip on citizens by perpetuating division and hostility in South Asia. Against a backdrop of a desire for economic growth, stability and globalization, that kind of bitterness is stale 60 odd years later. So I’m looking forward to reading the book and am lucky that my copy was reserved before the ban, in safe hands far from from protests and government intervention.

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Intricacies of the Afghan Election

August 21, 2009

Polls opened today in Afghanistan with Washington watching closely in hopes that elections are peaceful and leave a lasting mark of democracy for future state building. Pakistan has the same interest on perhaps an even more immediate level. Successful elections in Afghanistan are an integral ingredient to Pakistan’s domestic offensive in uprooting dangerous factions, expanding the economy, nurturing their democracy and stabilizing relations with neighbors. But if a candidate does not receive at least 50% of votes in this first round, “elections are pushed into a second, more unpredictable round of voting“. And second round elections might agitate an already rickety political climate amidst apprehensions of violence, which is entirely detrimental for Pakistan given domestic and regional circumstances right now.

On the domestic front, Pakistan’s military continues to make progress against dangerous groups. Weakened by the death (and or disappearance) of leader Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban in Pakistan “seems to be in disarray”. Meaning Islamabad’s offensive against factions this year are bearing fruits for the War on Terror and shifting toward more stability, hopefully for the long term. But if elections in Afghanistan are pushed to a second round, weeks of political irresolution can allow terrorist groups a climate of uncertainty within which to recuperate from losses and cause turmoil. Which since 2001 has shown that a dangerous spillover effect exists wherein Afghani militant groups shift in to Pakistan harboring themselves into the nebulous, virtually imperturbable border.

Broader regional considerations also factor into Pakistan’s hopes for stable elections. The spillover of militant groups since 9/11 intensifies Pakistan’s long desired interest in seeing a democratic, stable Afghanistan where refugees may repatriate. In fact,Pakistan hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world, an underreported story that actually helps explain why dangerous factions were able to develop in Pakistan. Millions of devastated Afghans, some armed and many destitute from fighting Soviets in the 1980’s found refuge from their war ravaged country in Pakistan. A mostly destitute population seeking refuge in a developing country with highly volatile political circumstances allowed violent sectarian and religiously extremist factions to exploit and recruit refugees to their cause. In addition, there are heavy economic costs for Pakistan in maintaining such a large number of refugees. Since last years military escalation in Afghanistan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees explains that there is around 2 to 2.1 million Afghani Refugees now living in Pakistan. He said the United Nations planned to launch an emergency appeal for hundreds of millions of dollars needed to sustain refugees that have come in just this past year. So peaceful elections in a first round that move Afghanistan in a direction of democratic stability is integral to Pakistan’s security: they relieve Islamabad of a very costly responsibility to a long-standing refugee challenge.

Although some minority, yet raucous opinions say elections ushering democratic authority are not in Islamabad’s interest because they “diminish Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan”. Thus suggesting policymakers are strategically motivated to prevent losing an allegedly malleable buffer zone that Afghanistan serves against India. It’s an unlikely, poorly reasoned notion. It attempts to be qualified by citing Islamabad’s insistence on uprooting domestic militant/fundamentalist groups, so as to avoid confrontation with a supposed malleable buffer forces. But expecting policy makers to divert efforts from turmoil at home to external threats is a laughable assertion. Before taking care of neighboring militant groups whose primary focus is not on fighting Pakistanis, Islamabad legitimately devotes resources to uprooting domestic factions who pose an immediate threat. Suicide bombings have become an almost weekly recurrence in Pakistan and with that level of instability, faulting Pakistan for not doing enough to uproot neighboring terror is outrageous. Plus, NATO forces and amplified American presence in Afghanistan furthers the absurdity of such calls for Pakistan to ignore turmoil at home and focus on Afghanistan. And neither of these allegations logically indicate a Pakistani motivation for instability so as to use Afghanistan as a buffer zone.

But perhaps the most unreasonable way of supporting a notion that Pakistan lacks interest in successful elections refers to relations with India. Specifically, that Islamabad’s refusal to remove forces from the Indian border despite current spillover from Afghanistan indicates an excessive concern with an Indian threat. A few reasons why this is incorrect: firstly, referring again to amplified U.S. and current NATO presence and given an abundance of domestic threats that require Islamabad’s attention, removing troops from the Indian border to the Afghan border does little to help Pakistan now, (especially weighted against the risks of doing so). Secondly, even if troops from were redeployed, those forces are squarely trained/equipped to face a potential Indian threat, not in counterterrorism. Which became well known much to Washington’s dismay with the military’s many unsuccessful attempts at uprooting militants from the northern regions along the Afghan border.

Finally, a refusal to redeploy forces is not because of an excessive concern given the reality of current Indian-Pakistani relations. The Mumbai atrocities occurred less than a year ago and the aftermath saw a speedy, vehement escalation of tensions. Some Indian media and politicians fanned the flames, and when tensions rise between India and Pakistan, the world gets nervous. By way of a counterfactual, we can tie how these tensions relate to justifying Islamabad’s decision to maintain troops on the border: If, God Forbid, another atrocity took place on Indian soil since 11/26/08 and Pakistan had redeployed troops away from the border. The result could be an even further escalation of tensions. A terrifying potential  for confrontation ensues and Pakistan’s capacity to defend against an already far more immense Indian force is drastically diminished. Which itself has a potential to cause hasty, over offensive beahvior from either side. Basic lessons in Realism thus teach us that redeployment away from the Indian border is out of the question. Given history, and sensitive circumstances since 11/26 I think military strategy might advise the same. Thus from a Pakistani policymakers point of view, troops on the Indian border is a legitimate priority. If anything, one might even argue they deter confrontation.

So, allegations that Islamabad is not sufficiently committed to stable election processes in Afghanistan are just not reasonable. If anything, successful elections relieve Pakistan of deep social and economic costs through refugee repatriation. And from the Mumbai atrocities to countless civilians who suffer daily from terror and a climate of instability that allows violent factions to operate, a peaceful, prosperous Afghanistan beginning with successful elections is very much in Pakistan’s interest.

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